复制安装命令
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A model-agnostic agent-skills platform.
用 Codex 或 Claude 安装复制这段 Prompt,粘贴到 Codex、Claude 或其他助手里,让它先审查 Skill 页面再帮你安装。
复制前请先查看来源、License 和安全提示。
来源文件:README.md
A model-agnostic agent-skills platform. The canonical layer is harness-free by construction; Claude Code is currently the verified-native harness. Other harnesses remain engineering candidates until their native-path integration is verified; source research alone is never presented as public support.
Version semantics: the release badge is this marketplace's display version. npm packages, including the
ccpiCLI and publishable plugins, retain their own package versions; they are intentionally not expected to equal the display version. The version-surface checker governs the display surfaces without rewriting package semver.
Inside Claude Code, one command installs the whole marketplace:
/plugin marketplace add jeremylongshore/claude-code-plugins
Or use the CLI:
pnpm add -g @intentsolutionsio/ccpi
ccpi install devops-automation-pack
Browse the marketplace · Explore plugins · Download bundles
Killer Skill of the Week — no-ai-slop by Peter Yang
Strip AI slop from any draft — named-pattern edits that keep the writer's real voice
no-ai-slop does two jobs and refuses to fake a third. In Edit mode it makes the minimum effective edit — cutting throat-clearing, weak verbs, and abstract nouns while deliberately preserving the writer's cadence, bluntness, humor, and honest admissions, so a rough draft still sounds like the same person afterward. In Detect mode it names each AI-slop pattern it finds, quotes the offending line, and gives the fix in a few words — and pointedly does NOT score the draft or guess whether an AI wrote it. That restraint is the whole point: AI detectors guess; named patterns are evidence the reader can check. MIT-licensed, single focused skill, actively maintained by Peter Yang.
"AI detectors guess. Named patterns are evidence the user can check." — Peter Yang
Grade: A | Week of July 22, 2026 (W30) | View on GitHub
Previous picks: tonone, mnemos, databricks-pack, kobiton-automate, skyvern, code-cleanup, web-analytics, token-optimizer, executive-assistant-skills, skill-creator, cursor-pack, crypto-portfolio-tracker. See all at tonsofskills.com.
Every number below names the cohort it counts and the command that reproduces it — an unlabeled count is how a corpus ends up with five contradictory answers to "how many skills."
| Count | Cohort | Reproduce with |
|---|---|---|
| 442 | catalog plugins (catalog-entry cohort) | node scripts/generate-readme-toc.mjs over marketplace.extended.json |
| 3,067 | marketplace-visible skills (distinct) | node -e "import('./scripts/corpus-resolver.mjs').then(m=>console.log(m.resolveCorpus('marketplace-visible').length))" |
| 347 | agent definitions in plugins | git ls-files 'plugins/**' | grep '/agents/.*\.md' |
| 19 | plugin categories | ls -d plugins/*/ |
Across 396 published packages in the claude-code-plugins namespace. Updated daily by GitHub Actions.
| Window | All packages | Established (>30d) |
|---|---|---|
| Last 24 hours | 962 | 962 |
| Last 7 days | 2,920 | 2,916 |
| Last 30 days | 12,868 | 12,779 |
"Established" excludes packages first published within the last 30 days, so a bulk-publish event doesn't dominate the headline.
Top 10 by last 30 days:
Last refreshed 2026-08-19T03:03:05.709Z.
Five real questions, five doors — each resolves to a live, generated surface, never a hand-maintained list:
The 19 categories below link into the live marketplace. Plugin counts are the catalog-entry cohort — regenerated from marketplace.extended.json by this generator; the catalog itself lives on tonsofskills.com, never in this file (§ 6A of the platform blueprint).
| Category | Plugins | |
|---|---|---|
| 🤖 | AI & Machine Learning | 36 |
| 🎭 | AI Agents & Agency | 10 |
| 🔌 | API Development | 26 |
| 💼 | Business Tools | 6 |
| 👥 | Community | 21 |
| ₿ | Crypto & Web3 | 27 |
| 💾 | Database | 26 |
| 🎨 | Design | 2 |
| 🔧 | DevOps & Infrastructure | 36 |
| 📚 | Examples & Templates | 5 |
| 🧩 | MCP Servers | 16 |
| 📦 | Packages | 5 |
| ⚡ | Performance | 25 |
| ✅ | Productivity | 30 |
| 🎁 | SaaS Skill Packs | 106 |
| 🔐 | Security | 27 |
| ✨ | Skill Enhancers | 9 |
| 🧪 | Testing | 28 |
| 📁 | Analytics | 1 |
Four artifact classes live in this repository, distinguished on sight and never blurred — provenance is a truth requirement here, not a UX nicety:
| Class | What it is | How the reader can tell |
|---|---|---|
| Canonical skill | First-party, harness-free, the source of truth | No .source.json in its plugin directory |
| Generated adapter | A thin, machine-produced harness projection | Lives under a generated path with a "generated — do not edit" header |
| First-party package | An Intent Solutions distribution (npm, cowork zip) | @intentsolutionsio scope, IS-authored license |
| Upstream mirror | Somebody else's work, hosted mirror-by-default | .source.json present — upstream author, license, and pinned commit recorded |
Not yet certified. The certification program (tiers T0–T4 with retained, hash-matched evidence) is a later epic of the platform blueprint; until its report exists, no artifact on this surface claims a tier. This line is rendered from the absence of certification-report.json — honestly, not cosmetically.
Start with the contribution guide, then the intake and review standards every submission passes through:
External plugins are hosted mirror-by-default: the contributor's repository stays the source of truth, every mirrored source is pinned in a content lockfile, and upstream credit — author, license, resolved commit — is recorded in the mirror itself. Improvements flow by upstreaming to the author's repository, never by silently editing the mirror. The full decision record is the external-sync model.
MIT for the repository scaffolding and first-party tooling; each plugin carries its own license in its manifest, and mirrored plugins keep their upstream license verbatim.
name: algolia-security-basics
description: 'Apply Algolia security best practices: API key scoping, secured API
keys,
frontend vs backend key separation, and key rotation.
Trigger: "algolia security", "algolia API key security", "secure algolia",
"algolia secrets", "algolia key rotation", "algolia secured key".
'
allowed-tools: Read, Write, Edit, Grep
version: 1.7.0
license: MIT
author: Jeremy Longshore <jeremy@intentsolutions.io>
tags:
- saas
- search
- algolia
compatibility: Designed for Claude CodeAlgolia's security model is built around scoped API keys. Every Algolia app has three default keys (Admin, Search-Only, Monitoring). For production, create custom keys with minimal permissions and use Secured API Keys for per-user/per-tenant restrictions.
| Key Type | ACL | Expose to Frontend? | Use Case |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admin | All operations | NEVER | Backend indexing, settings, key management |
| Search-Only | search only | Yes (safe) | Frontend search widgets |
| Monitoring | Read monitoring data | No | Health checks, dashboards |
| Custom | You define ACL | Depends on ACL | Scoped backend services |
| Secured | Derived from parent key | Yes | Per-user filtered search |
The environment, scoped-key, secured-key, and rotation examples demonstrate least privilege at each trust boundary. Replace placeholder values through the secret store and validate the resulting ACL before a client receives the key.
# .env (NEVER commit — add to .gitignore)
ALGOLIA_APP_ID=YourApplicationID
ALGOLIA_ADMIN_KEY=admin_api_key_here # Backend only
ALGOLIA_SEARCH_KEY=search_only_key_here # OK for frontend
# .gitignore — MUST include:
.env
.env.local
.env.*.local
import { algoliasearch } from 'algoliasearch';
const client = algoliasearch(process.env.ALGOLIA_APP_ID!, process.env.ALGOLIA_ADMIN_KEY!);
// Create a write-only key for a specific microservice
const { key: indexingKey } = await client.addApiKey({
apiKey: {
acl: ['addObject', 'deleteObject', 'editSettings'],
description: 'Product sync service — write only',
indexes: ['products', 'products_staging'], // Restrict to specific indices
maxQueriesPerIPPerHour: 5000,
referers: [], // Empty = no referer restriction (backend use)
},
});
// Create a search key restricted to specific referers (frontend)
const { key: frontendKey } = await client.addApiKey({
apiKey: {
acl: ['search'],
description: 'Frontend search — domain-restricted',
indexes: ['products'],
referers: ['https://mystore.com/*', 'https://*.mystore.com/*'],
maxQueriesPerIPPerHour: 1000,
maxHitsPerQuery: 50,
},
});
// Secured API keys are generated on YOUR server, not via Algolia API.
// They embed restrictions that the client can't bypass.
function generateUserSearchKey(userId: string, tenantId: string): string {
const client = algoliasearch(process.env.ALGOLIA_APP_ID!, process.env.ALGOLIA_ADMIN_KEY!);
return client.generateSecuredApiKey({
parentApiKey: process.env.ALGOLIA_SEARCH_KEY!,
restrictions: {
// User can only see their tenant's data
filters: `tenant_id:${tenantId}`,
// Key expires in 1 hour
validUntil: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) + 3600,
// Restrict to specific indices
restrictIndices: ['products'],
// Optional: restrict sources (IPs)
restrictSources: '',
},
});
}
// Usage in your API endpoint:
// const userKey = generateUserSearchKey(req.user.id, req.user.tenantId);
// return { appId: process.env.ALGOLIA_APP_ID, searchKey: userKey };
async function rotateApiKey(oldKeyDescription: string) {
const client = algoliasearch(process.env.ALGOLIA_APP_ID!, process.env.ALGOLIA_ADMIN_KEY!);
// 1. List keys to find the old one
const { keys } = await client.listApiKeys();
const oldKey = keys.find(k => k.description === oldKeyDescription);
if (!oldKey) throw new Error(`Key not found: ${oldKeyDescription}`);
// 2. Create new key with same ACL
const { key: newKey } = await client.addApiKey({
apiKey: {
acl: oldKey.acl,
description: `${oldKeyDescription} (rotated ${new Date().toISOString().split('T')[0]})`,
indexes: oldKey.indexes || [],
maxQueriesPerIPPerHour: oldKey.maxQueriesPerIPPerHour || 0,
referers: oldKey.referers || [],
},
});
console.log(`New key created: ...${newKey.slice(-8)}`);
console.log('Update your env vars, then delete the old key:');
console.log(` client.deleteApiKey({ key: '${oldKey.value}' })`);
return newKey;
}
.env files in .gitignorereferers set on frontend keys to prevent abusemaxQueriesPerIPPerHour set on all public keysvalidUntil (expiration)The application separates Admin, search-only, monitoring, custom, and secured keys by use case, with documented ACLs and a revocation path. Browser clients never receive a credential capable of indexing or changing settings.
| Security Issue | Detection | Mitigation |
|---|---|---|
| Admin key exposed in frontend | Code review, git scanning | Rotate immediately, restrict referers |
| Key in git history | git log -S 'ALGOLIA' | Rotate key, use git-secrets or gitleaks |
| Excessive ACL on key | Audit key permissions | Create scoped replacement key |
| Expired secured key | validUntil in the past | Generate fresh secured key |
For production deployment, see algolia-prod-checklist.
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