复制安装命令
用 Codex 或 Claude 安装复制这段 Prompt,粘贴到 Codex、Claude 或其他助手里,让它先审查 Skill 页面再帮你安装。
复制前请先查看来源、License 和安全提示。
A model-agnostic agent-skills platform.
用 Codex 或 Claude 安装复制这段 Prompt,粘贴到 Codex、Claude 或其他助手里,让它先审查 Skill 页面再帮你安装。
复制前请先查看来源、License 和安全提示。
来源文件:README.md
A model-agnostic agent-skills platform. The canonical layer is harness-free by construction; Claude Code is currently the verified-native harness. Other harnesses remain engineering candidates until their native-path integration is verified; source research alone is never presented as public support.
Inside Claude Code, one command installs the whole marketplace:
/plugin marketplace add jeremylongshore/claude-code-plugins
Or use the CLI:
pnpm add -g @intentsolutionsio/ccpi
ccpi install devops-automation-pack
Browse the marketplace · Explore plugins · Download bundles
Killer Skill of the Week — no-ai-slop by Peter Yang
Strip AI slop from any draft — named-pattern edits that keep the writer's real voice
no-ai-slop does two jobs and refuses to fake a third. In Edit mode it makes the minimum effective edit — cutting throat-clearing, weak verbs, and abstract nouns while deliberately preserving the writer's cadence, bluntness, humor, and honest admissions, so a rough draft still sounds like the same person afterward. In Detect mode it names each AI-slop pattern it finds, quotes the offending line, and gives the fix in a few words — and pointedly does NOT score the draft or guess whether an AI wrote it. That restraint is the whole point: AI detectors guess; named patterns are evidence the reader can check. MIT-licensed, single focused skill, actively maintained by Peter Yang.
"AI detectors guess. Named patterns are evidence the user can check." — Peter Yang
Grade: A | Week of July 22, 2026 (W30) | View on GitHub
Previous picks: tonone, mnemos, databricks-pack, kobiton-automate, skyvern, code-cleanup, web-analytics, token-optimizer, executive-assistant-skills, skill-creator, cursor-pack, crypto-portfolio-tracker. See all at tonsofskills.com.
Every number below names the cohort it counts and the command that reproduces it — an unlabeled count is how a corpus ends up with five contradictory answers to "how many skills."
| Count | Cohort | Reproduce with |
|---|---|---|
| 442 | catalog plugins (catalog-entry cohort) | node scripts/generate-readme-toc.mjs over marketplace.extended.json |
| 3,067 | marketplace-visible skills (distinct) | node -e "import('./scripts/corpus-resolver.mjs').then(m=>console.log(m.resolveCorpus('marketplace-visible').length))" |
| 347 | agent definitions in plugins | git ls-files 'plugins/**' | grep '/agents/.*\.md' |
| 19 | plugin categories | ls -d plugins/*/ |
Across 396 published packages in the claude-code-plugins namespace. Updated daily by GitHub Actions.
| Window | All packages | Established (>30d) |
|---|---|---|
| Last 24 hours | 962 | 962 |
| Last 7 days | 2,920 | 2,916 |
| Last 30 days | 12,868 | 12,779 |
"Established" excludes packages first published within the last 30 days, so a bulk-publish event doesn't dominate the headline.
Top 10 by last 30 days:
Last refreshed 2026-08-19T03:03:05.709Z.
Five real questions, five doors — each resolves to a live, generated surface, never a hand-maintained list:
The 19 categories below link into the live marketplace. Plugin counts are the catalog-entry cohort — regenerated from marketplace.extended.json by this generator; the catalog itself lives on tonsofskills.com, never in this file (§ 6A of the platform blueprint).
| Category | Plugins | |
|---|---|---|
| 🤖 | AI & Machine Learning | 36 |
| 🎭 | AI Agents & Agency | 10 |
| 🔌 | API Development | 26 |
| 💼 | Business Tools | 6 |
| 👥 | Community | 21 |
| ₿ | Crypto & Web3 | 27 |
| 💾 | Database | 26 |
| 🎨 | Design | 2 |
| 🔧 | DevOps & Infrastructure | 36 |
| 📚 | Examples & Templates | 5 |
| 🧩 | MCP Servers | 16 |
| 📦 | Packages | 5 |
| ⚡ | Performance | 25 |
| ✅ | Productivity | 30 |
| 🎁 | SaaS Skill Packs | 106 |
| 🔐 | Security | 27 |
| ✨ | Skill Enhancers | 9 |
| 🧪 | Testing | 28 |
| 📁 | Analytics | 1 |
Four artifact classes live in this repository, distinguished on sight and never blurred — provenance is a truth requirement here, not a UX nicety:
| Class | What it is | How the reader can tell |
|---|---|---|
| Canonical skill | First-party, harness-free, the source of truth | No .source.json in its plugin directory |
| Generated adapter | A thin, machine-produced harness projection | Lives under a generated path with a "generated — do not edit" header |
| First-party package | An Intent Solutions distribution (npm, cowork zip) | @intentsolutionsio scope, IS-authored license |
| Upstream mirror | Somebody else's work, hosted mirror-by-default | .source.json present — upstream author, license, and pinned commit recorded |
Not yet certified. The certification program (tiers T0–T4 with retained, hash-matched evidence) is a later epic of the platform blueprint; until its report exists, no artifact on this surface claims a tier. This line is rendered from the absence of certification-report.json — honestly, not cosmetically.
Start with the contribution guide, then the intake and review standards every submission passes through:
External plugins are hosted mirror-by-default: the contributor's repository stays the source of truth, every mirrored source is pinned in a content lockfile, and upstream credit — author, license, resolved commit — is recorded in the mirror itself. Improvements flow by upstreaming to the author's repository, never by silently editing the mirror. The full decision record is the external-sync model.
MIT for the repository scaffolding and first-party tooling; each plugin carries its own license in its manifest, and mirrored plugins keep their upstream license verbatim.
name: analyzing-tls-config
description: |
Analyze a target's TLS configuration — negotiated protocol version, cipher
suite, certificate chain, expiry, and downgrade vectors.
Use when: SOC2 auditor flagged your endpoint for "weak TLS" but you don't
know which control failed (TSC CC6.7 transmission integrity vs CC6.6
encryption) or which cipher is the problem.
Threshold: any negotiated TLSv1.0 or TLSv1.1, OR a cipher with RC4 / 3DES /
null / EXPORT, OR a cert with under 30 days to expiry, OR a chain that fails
hostname verification.
Trigger with: "audit tls", "check ssl config", "weak tls", "analyze tls".
allowed-tools:
- Read
- Bash(python3:*)
- Bash(openssl:*)
disallowed-tools:
- Bash(rm:*)
- Edit(/etc/*)
- Write(/etc/*)
version: 3.30.0
author: Jeremy Longshore <jeremy@intentsolutions.io>
license: MIT
compatibility: Designed for Claude Code
tags:
- security
- tls
- ssl
- pentest
- transport-layerThis skill audits a target's TLS posture against current best practice (NIST SP 800-52r2, Mozilla TLS Configuration Guidelines, PCI DSS v4.0 Req 4.2.1.1). It reports specific findings — not "your TLS is weak" but "your server negotiated TLSv1.0 with RC4-SHA — see remediation".
Specific failure thresholds, in order of severity:
| Finding | Severity | Threshold | Affected control |
|---|---|---|---|
| TLSv1.0 or TLSv1.1 negotiated | HIGH | Any handshake completes at v1.0/v1.1 | NIST 800-52r2 §3.1, PCI DSS Req 4.2.1.1 |
| Null / EXPORT / anonymous cipher | CRITICAL | Any null / EXPORT / aNULL in negotiated suite | NIST 800-52r2 §3.3.1 |
| RC4 / 3DES cipher | HIGH | Sweet32, RC4 biases | NIST 800-52r2 §3.3.1, PCI DSS Req 4.2.1.1 |
| Cert expires in <7 days | CRITICAL | notAfter - now ≤ 7d | NIST 800-52r2 §4.1 |
| Cert expires in <30 days | HIGH | notAfter - now ≤ 30d | NIST 800-52r2 §4.1 |
| Cert hostname mismatch | HIGH | SAN/CN doesn't match target host | RFC 6125 |
| Self-signed or untrusted CA | MEDIUM | Chain doesn't validate to system CA | Mozilla TLS Guidelines |
| Weak key (RSA < 2048, ECDSA < 256) | HIGH | Public key bits below threshold | NIST 800-52r2 §3.4 |
| Forward secrecy absent | MEDIUM | No ECDHE / DHE in negotiated suite | NIST 800-52r2 §3.3.1 |
openssl CLI (used for cipher enumeration the Python ssl module can't introspect directly)references/AUTHORIZATION.md)Active scan. Before invoking the scanner, ask the user verbatim:
"Do you have authorization to perform TLS testing on this target? I need confirmation before proceeding."
If the user says yes, proceed. If unsure, ask them to obtain written
authorization. See references/AUTHORIZATION.md for the attestation
pattern. Never run the scanner against a target the user does not own
or have written permission to test.
python3 ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/skills/analyzing-tls-config/scripts/analyze_tls.py \
https://target.example.com \
--authorized
The --authorized flag is required for any non-loopback / non-RFC1918
target (gate enforced in lib/authz_check.py).
Options:
Usage: analyze_tls.py URL [OPTIONS]
Options:
--authorized Attest authorization for non-local targets (required)
--port PORT Target port (default: 443)
--output FILE Write findings to FILE (default: stdout)
--format FMT json | jsonl | markdown (default: markdown)
--min-severity SEV Floor: critical|high|medium|low|info (default: info)
--timeout SECS Per-probe timeout (default: 10)
The scanner emits one Finding per detected issue. For each:
references/PLAYBOOK.md for the full template if the
inline remediation is just a one-liner.Group findings by severity. For each, lead with the specific symptom ("TLSv1.0 negotiated") rather than the category ("transport security problem"). Pair every finding with one remediation step the user can take in the next 30 minutes.
If the user is doing a broader audit:
detecting-ssl-cert-issues (skill #2)
for deeper cert-chain analysis (revocation, CT log presence,
intermediate-cert order).checking-http-security-headers (skill #4) to audit HSTS preload
status, which is meaningless without proper TLS.User says: "Auditor flagged our checkout endpoint for weak TLS. Help me figure out what's wrong."
python3 ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/skills/analyzing-tls-config/scripts/analyze_tls.py \
https://checkout.example.com \
--authorized \
--min-severity high
Expected output: a Markdown report with each HIGH/CRITICAL finding, the
specific NIST/PCI control it violates, and a copy-paste remediation
snippet for the target server type. Pair with references/PLAYBOOK.md
for full templates.
Pin the scan into the deploy pipeline before promotion:
- name: TLS posture check (staging)
run: |
python3 plugins/security/penetration-tester/skills/analyzing-tls-config/scripts/analyze_tls.py \
https://staging.example.com \
--authorized \
--min-severity high \
--format json \
--output tls-report.json
Exit code 1 fails the deploy if any HIGH/CRITICAL finding lands. The JSON report uploads as a build artifact for the security team to triage.
For local services (carve-out applies — no --authorized needed):
python3 ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/skills/analyzing-tls-config/scripts/analyze_tls.py \
https://localhost:8443
Useful when prototyping TLS-terminating proxies (Caddy, Traefik) before shipping to staging.
Each finding includes:
skill_id: analyzing-tls-configtitle: imperative — e.g. "Server negotiates obsolete TLSv1.0"severity: critical / high / medium / low / infotarget: the URL scanneddetail: technical explanation of WHY this finding triggeredremediation: specific fixcvss_score / cwe_id: when applicableaffected_control: framework + control ID (e.g. NIST 800-52r2 §3.1)references: source URLsJSON output is pipeable to jq for CI integration. Markdown output is
human-readable for direct sharing with the engineering team.
Exit codes: 0 clean (no high/critical), 1 findings (high or critical),
2 error (auth missing, target unreachable, unparseable input).
--authorized missing for non-local target → exit 2 with attestation
message pointing to references/AUTHORIZATION.md. Re-run with the flag
after confirming authorization.
Target unreachable → exit 2 with the underlying socket error. Common
causes: firewall blocks port 443, DNS resolution failure, server not
listening on the configured port (try --port).
Certificate chain incomplete → finding emitted at MEDIUM severity (the scanner does not bail; it captures what was sent and reports the gap).
references/THEORY.md — How TLS negotiation works, why each finding
matters, primary RFC referencesreferences/PLAYBOOK.md — Copy-paste remediation templates per finding
for nginx, Caddy, Apache, HAProxy, AWS ALB, GCP LBreferences/AUTHORIZATION.md — Authorization attestation pattern + ROE
example for active scans
评论 (0)
暂无评论,成为第一个评论者吧!