复制安装命令
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A model-agnostic agent-skills platform.
用 Codex 或 Claude 安装复制这段 Prompt,粘贴到 Codex、Claude 或其他助手里,让它先审查 Skill 页面再帮你安装。
复制前请先查看来源、License 和安全提示。
来源文件:README.md
A model-agnostic agent-skills platform. The canonical layer is harness-free by construction; Claude Code is currently the verified-native harness. Other harnesses remain engineering candidates until their native-path integration is verified; source research alone is never presented as public support.
Version semantics: the release badge is this marketplace's display version. npm packages, including the
ccpiCLI and publishable plugins, retain their own package versions; they are intentionally not expected to equal the display version. The version-surface checker governs the display surfaces without rewriting package semver.
Inside Claude Code, one command installs the whole marketplace:
/plugin marketplace add jeremylongshore/claude-code-plugins
Or use the CLI:
pnpm add -g @intentsolutionsio/ccpi
ccpi install devops-automation-pack
Browse the marketplace · Explore plugins · Download bundles
Killer Skill of the Week — no-ai-slop by Peter Yang
Strip AI slop from any draft — named-pattern edits that keep the writer's real voice
no-ai-slop does two jobs and refuses to fake a third. In Edit mode it makes the minimum effective edit — cutting throat-clearing, weak verbs, and abstract nouns while deliberately preserving the writer's cadence, bluntness, humor, and honest admissions, so a rough draft still sounds like the same person afterward. In Detect mode it names each AI-slop pattern it finds, quotes the offending line, and gives the fix in a few words — and pointedly does NOT score the draft or guess whether an AI wrote it. That restraint is the whole point: AI detectors guess; named patterns are evidence the reader can check. MIT-licensed, single focused skill, actively maintained by Peter Yang.
"AI detectors guess. Named patterns are evidence the user can check." — Peter Yang
Grade: A | Week of July 22, 2026 (W30) | View on GitHub
Previous picks: tonone, mnemos, databricks-pack, kobiton-automate, code-cleanup, web-analytics, token-optimizer, executive-assistant-skills, skill-creator, cursor-pack, crypto-portfolio-tracker. See all at tonsofskills.com.
Every number below names the cohort it counts and the command that reproduces it — an unlabeled count is how a corpus ends up with five contradictory answers to "how many skills."
| Count | Cohort | Reproduce with |
|---|---|---|
| 440 | catalog plugins (catalog-entry cohort) | node scripts/generate-readme-toc.mjs over marketplace.extended.json |
| 2,984 | marketplace-visible skills (distinct) | node -e "import('./scripts/corpus-resolver.mjs').then(m=>console.log(m.resolveCorpus('marketplace-visible').length))" |
| 347 | agent definitions in plugins | git ls-files 'plugins/**' | grep '/agents/.*\.md' |
| 19 | plugin categories | ls -d plugins/*/ |
Across 396 published packages in the claude-code-plugins namespace. Updated daily by GitHub Actions.
| Window | All packages | Established (>30d) |
|---|---|---|
| Last 24 hours | 962 | 962 |
| Last 7 days | 2,920 | 2,916 |
| Last 30 days | 12,868 | 12,779 |
"Established" excludes packages first published within the last 30 days, so a bulk-publish event doesn't dominate the headline.
Top 10 by last 30 days:
Last refreshed 2026-08-19T03:03:05.709Z.
Five real questions, five doors — each resolves to a live, generated surface, never a hand-maintained list:
The 19 categories below link into the live marketplace. Plugin counts are the catalog-entry cohort — regenerated from marketplace.extended.json by this generator; the catalog itself lives on tonsofskills.com, never in this file (§ 6A of the platform blueprint).
| Category | Plugins | |
|---|---|---|
| 🤖 | AI & Machine Learning | 37 |
| 🎭 | AI Agents & Agency | 9 |
| 🔌 | API Development | 26 |
| 💼 | Business Tools | 6 |
| 👥 | Community | 20 |
| ₿ | Crypto & Web3 | 27 |
| 💾 | Database | 26 |
| 🎨 | Design | 2 |
| 🔧 | DevOps & Infrastructure | 36 |
| 📚 | Examples & Templates | 5 |
| 🧩 | MCP Servers | 17 |
| 📦 | Packages | 5 |
| ⚡ | Performance | 25 |
| ✅ | Productivity | 29 |
| 🎁 | SaaS Skill Packs | 105 |
| 🔐 | Security | 27 |
| ✨ | Skill Enhancers | 9 |
| 🧪 | Testing | 28 |
| 📁 | Analytics | 1 |
Four artifact classes live in this repository, distinguished on sight and never blurred — provenance is a truth requirement here, not a UX nicety:
| Class | What it is | How the reader can tell |
|---|---|---|
| Canonical skill | First-party, harness-free, the source of truth | No .source.json in its plugin directory |
| Generated adapter | A thin, machine-produced harness projection | Lives under a generated path with a "generated — do not edit" header |
| First-party package | An Intent Solutions distribution (npm, cowork zip) | @intentsolutionsio scope, IS-authored license |
| Upstream mirror | Somebody else's work, hosted mirror-by-default | .source.json present — upstream author, license, and pinned commit recorded |
Not yet certified. The certification program (tiers T0–T4 with retained, hash-matched evidence) is a later epic of the platform blueprint; until its report exists, no artifact on this surface claims a tier. This line is rendered from the absence of certification-report.json — honestly, not cosmetically.
Start with the contribution guide, then the intake and review standards every submission passes through:
External plugins are hosted mirror-by-default: the contributor's repository stays the source of truth, every mirrored source is pinned in a content lockfile, and upstream credit — author, license, resolved commit — is recorded in the mirror itself. Improvements flow by upstreaming to the author's repository, never by silently editing the mirror. The full decision record is the external-sync model.
MIT for the repository scaffolding and first-party tooling; each plugin carries its own license in its manifest, and mirrored plugins keep their upstream license verbatim.
name: apple-notes-enterprise-rbac
description: 'Implement access control for multi-user Apple Notes automation.
Trigger: "apple notes access control".
'
allowed-tools: Read, Write, Edit, Bash(osascript:*), Grep
version: 1.6.0
license: MIT
author: Jeremy Longshore <jeremy@intentsolutions.io>
tags:
- saas
- macos
- apple-notes
- automation
compatibility: Designed for Claude CodeApple Notes has no built-in role-based access control (RBAC). In enterprise environments with Managed Apple IDs via Apple Business Manager, administrators control Notes access through MDM (Mobile Device Management) profiles. For multi-user automation scenarios, implement access control at the automation layer using account separation, folder-based permissions, and shared folder restrictions. iCloud Shared Notes (macOS Ventura+) provide basic collaboration, but fine-grained permissions (read-only vs edit) must be enforced in your wrapper code.
// Apple Notes supports multiple accounts (iCloud, Gmail, On My Mac)
// Use account separation as the primary access boundary
const Notes = Application("Notes");
function getAccountByName(name) {
const account = Notes.accounts().find(a => a.name() === name);
if (!account) throw new Error(`Account not found: ${name}`);
return account;
}
// Audit all accounts and their folder structures
function auditAccounts() {
return Notes.accounts().map(a => ({
name: a.name(),
folders: a.folders().map(f => f.name()),
noteCount: a.notes().length,
}));
}
// Restrict automation to a specific account only
const ALLOWED_ACCOUNT = "iCloud";
function safeGetNotes() {
const account = getAccountByName(ALLOWED_ACCOUNT);
return account.notes();
}
// src/rbac/permissions.ts
interface FolderPermission {
folder: string;
allowedRoles: string[];
operations: ("read" | "write" | "delete")[];
}
const FOLDER_PERMISSIONS: FolderPermission[] = [
{ folder: "Public", allowedRoles: ["viewer", "editor", "admin"], operations: ["read"] },
{ folder: "Team", allowedRoles: ["editor", "admin"], operations: ["read", "write"] },
{ folder: "Sensitive", allowedRoles: ["admin"], operations: ["read", "write", "delete"] },
];
function checkPermission(role: string, folder: string, op: "read" | "write" | "delete"): boolean {
const perm = FOLDER_PERMISSIONS.find(p => p.folder === folder);
if (!perm) return false;
return perm.allowedRoles.includes(role) && perm.operations.includes(op);
}
# Apple Business Manager + MDM profiles can:
# 1. Disable Notes.app entirely on managed devices
# 2. Restrict iCloud Notes sync (force "On My Mac" only)
# 3. Enforce Managed Apple IDs (separate from personal)
# Check if device is MDM-managed
profiles status -type enrollment 2>/dev/null
# Check Notes restrictions via MDM profile
profiles list -verbose 2>/dev/null | grep -A5 "com.apple.notes"
# Managed Apple IDs cannot:
# - Share notes with personal Apple IDs
# - Use third-party account types (Gmail, Yahoo)
# - Access notes outside the organization's domain
// Audit shared notes (macOS Ventura+ with iCloud sharing)
const Notes = Application("Notes");
const allNotes = Notes.defaultAccount.notes();
// Notes shared via iCloud show as shared in the UI
// JXA does not expose sharing metadata directly
// Workaround: check folder names for "Shared" convention
const sharedFolders = Notes.defaultAccount.folders()
.filter(f => f.name().toLowerCase().includes("shared"));
sharedFolders.forEach(f => {
console.log(`Shared folder: ${f.name()} — ${f.notes().length} notes`);
});
| Issue | Cause | Solution |
|---|---|---|
| Cannot access Managed Apple ID notes | Personal automation on corporate device | Use the managed account explicitly via getAccountByName() |
| Shared folder not visible | iCloud sharing not accepted by recipient | Recipient must accept share invitation in Notes.app |
| MDM blocks osascript | Device restriction profile active | Request IT to allow automation; use Shortcuts as alternative |
| Folder permissions bypass | JXA has full access once TCC approved | Enforce permissions in your wrapper code, not at OS level |
| Multiple accounts create confusion | Notes from wrong account modified | Always specify account explicitly; never use defaultAccount in multi-user |
The RBAC layer returns an allow/deny decision, policy version, opaque subject and scope identifiers, and a redacted audit event. It does not treat account separation, folder names, or Notes sharing UI state as proof of authorization.
Before a delete request, resolve the caller through the identity source, require a role with the separately approved delete permission, verify the configured scope, and write an audit event before invoking Notes. A shared folder labelled Public still receives a deny decision unless the protected policy explicitly allows the caller and operation.
For multi-account environment configuration, see apple-notes-multi-env-setup. For security hardening, see apple-notes-security-basics.
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