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web2-recon

A self-contained Claude skill bundle for bug hunting and external red-team work · 82 skills · 15...

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项目 README

来源文件:README.md

抓取于 2026年8月4日

claude-bughunter banner

claude-bughunter

A self-contained Claude skill bundle for bug hunting and external red-team work · 82 skills · 15 slash commands · 681 disclosed-report patterns across 24 core vulnerability classes · enterprise identity + infrastructure attack matrices · engagement-folder scaffolding · Burp MCP integration · battle-tested across authorized red-team and bug-hunting engagements, plus public training platforms (DVWA, OWASP Juice Shop, Hacker101, testphp.vulnweb.com).

Built by Sachin Sharma — Bug Hunting & GenAI Security Research.

SPONSORED BY
Atlas Cloud


What is this?

claude-bughunter is a drop-in skill bundle for the Claude Code skills system. Install once and Claude Code stops being a chatbot and starts behaving like a senior bug-hunting researcher or red-team operator: it knows the techniques, the chain templates, the VRT mappings, the platform CVE chains, and the hygiene — and it stays in scope.

Four layers stack:

  • Think — bb-methodology + redteam-mindset: the 5-phase non-linear workflow, critical-thinking framework, and red-team operator discipline.
  • Hunt webapps — 48 hunt-* skills curated from 681 disclosed HackerOne reports: per-class detection patterns, payloads, bypass tables, and chain templates.
  • Hit the perimeter — enterprise platform chains (M365/Entra, Okta, vCenter, SSL-VPN appliances, SharePoint, cloud IAM): current 2024–2026 CVE chains + post-credential escalation.
  • Ship it — triage-validation + reporting + evidence-hygiene: the 7-Question Gate, VRT-aware severity, OOS rebuttals, PII redaction, and red-team deliverables.

All triggered automatically by topic — describe what you're testing in plain English and the relevant skill loads. No invocation by name.


Quickstart

Option A — install as a Claude Code plugin (recommended). From inside Claude Code:

/plugin marketplace add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter
/plugin install claude-bughunter@elementalsouls

All 82 skills + 15 commands load namespaced under claude-bughunter: and update when you bump the plugin version — no files copied into ~/.claude/.

Option B — copy install (no plugin system / pin to a clone):

git clone https://github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter.git
cd Claude-BugHunter
# macOS / Linux
bash scripts/install.sh

# Windows (PowerShell)
pwsh ./scripts/install.ps1

Both copy the skills + commands into ~/.claude/ (macOS/Linux) or %USERPROFILE%\.claude\ (Windows) and wire the hunt engagement scaffolder.

What each install path gives you:

Path82 skills + 15 slash commandscbh CLIhunt scaffolder
A — plugin✅ namespaced under claude-bughunter:➕ separate pipx install❌ clone-only
B — copy install✅ copied into ~/.claude/✅ from the clone✅ from the clone

The plugin is the fastest path to the skills + slash commands. The terminal-native cbh runner installs standalone — pipx install git+https://github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter — so plugin users can add it without a full clone (see cbh CLI). The hunt engagement scaffolder ships with the clone (Option B).

That's it. Open Claude Code and describe what you're testing in plain English — the right skill loads automatically, no invocation by name:

> Testing acme.com — an in-scope HackerOne target. Run recon and rank the surface.

  ⟳ loading skills: web2-recon, offensive-osint, bb-methodology …
    → subdomain enum (subfinder + crt.sh) … 47 hosts
    → live hosts (httpx) … 12 · tech fingerprint … 6 distinct stacks
    → ranked surface: api.acme.com (GraphQL, introspection ON)  ← start here
                      auth.acme.com (OAuth, SSO)               ← hunt-oauth

  Next: want me to probe the GraphQL introspection + OAuth redirect_uri?

→ Full Installation guide · Usage guide · searchable skill catalog.

The block above is an illustrative transcript. To record a real demo of your own session: asciinema rec demo.cast → upload to asciinema.org and drop the badge here.


Runs on four harnesses

One install, four agent harnesses — Claude Code, OpenCode, Codex CLI, Hermes Agent

The skills are plain Agent Skills — the same SKILL.md format that Claude Code · OpenCode · OpenAI Codex CLI · Hermes Agent all load. One command installs them everywhere:

# macOS / Linux
bash scripts/install.sh --all --burp-mcp

# Windows (PowerShell)
pwsh ./scripts/install.ps1 -All -BurpMcp

--all (-All) copies the skills to every harness's path (~/.claude/skills, ~/.agents/skills, ~/.hermes/skills); --burp-mcp (-BurpMcp) wires the Burp MCP server into each. The full knowledge layer ports to all four — the slash commands and /hunt engine stay Claude-Code-only by design.

→ Multi-harness guide


Star History

Star history chart for Claude-BugHunter

Chart is self-hosted — regenerate with python3 scripts/gen_star_history.py (needs gh auth login). Refreshes automatically each Monday via .github/workflows/star-history.yml.


Scope — what this bundle is for, and what it isn't

This bundle covers the external attack surface — anything reachable from the internet without first compromising an internal endpoint.

In scope

  • Bug bounty hunting — web apps, APIs, SaaS, GraphQL, OAuth, JWT, file upload, IDOR, SSRF, RCE chains
  • Web application pentesting — full hunt-* coverage of OWASP-mapped bug classes + discipline rules
  • External red-team engagements — initial-access against internet-facing enterprise estate: M365 / Entra ID, Okta-as-IdP, SharePoint on-prem (ToolShell + legacy SOAP), VMware vCenter / Workspace ONE, SSL VPN appliances (Cisco / Fortinet / Citrix / Palo Alto / Pulse / SonicWall / F5), Android APK red-team, supply-chain recon
  • Cloud misconfig + post-credential escalation — public S3, IMDS chains, STS AssumeRole, cross-account confused-deputy
  • Recon + OSINT — subdomain enum, identity-fabric mapping, certificate transparency, JS analysis, secret scanning
  • Reporting — H1, Bugcrowd (VRT-aware), Intigriti, Immunefi, plus client-facing red-team deliverable format

Out of scope (deliberate — not gaps, design decisions)

  • Internal Active Directory attacks — BloodHound, Kerberoasting, ASREProast, DCSync, Pass-the-Hash, AD CS abuse, ntlmrelayx, Responder, PetitPotam, etc. Different operational risk profile; needs different tooling and judgment. Future bundle, not this one.
  • C2 frameworks — Cobalt Strike, Sliver, Mythic, Havoc, BRC4 tradecraft. Out of scope for external-only engagement model.
  • Post-exploit / persistence / lateral — Mimikatz/comsvcs LSASS dumping, golden/silver tickets, named-pipe impersonation, persistence (registry, scheduled tasks, WMI events, COM hijacking), token theft. These start after the perimeter has already broken — different bundle territory.
  • Evasion — AMSI bypass, ETW patching, AV/EDR bypass. Tied to C2 tradecraft above.
  • iOS pentesting / hardware / RF / ICS — out of scope by design.
  • Binary exploitation / kernel pwn / browser internals — different skill universe.

If you're running an internal red team that includes domain-takeover chains via Kerberos or lateral movement, this bundle won't help you in those phases — and we'd rather say that up front than have you find out mid-engagement. The external surface handoff to internal-RT tooling (Impacket, NetExec, CrackMapExec, Rubeus, Certify, BloodHound) is intentionally outside our scope. Coverage for internal AD and post-exploit may come in a future update.


What's inside

82 skills, auto-loaded by topic — no invocation by name. Coverage across the external attack surface:

Category#Examples
Web application hunting13XSS, SQLi, SSRF, IDOR, LFI, SSTI, XXE, CSRF, CORS, open-redirect
Authentication & identity7auth-bypass, session, OAuth, SAML, MFA-bypass, ATO
API & infrastructure15GraphQL, gRPC, WebSocket, API-misconfig, host-header, RCE
Advanced & concurrency6race-condition, HTTP smuggling, deserialization, cache-poison
Framework-specific4Next.js, Node.js, Laravel, Spring Boot
Enterprise identity & cloud ★3M365/Entra, Okta, cloud-IAM-deep
Infrastructure & appliance ★4VMware vCenter, enterprise VPN, SharePoint, ASP.NET/NTLM
Red-team tradecraft ★4redteam-mindset, APK pipeline, supply-chain recon, mid-engagement IR
Recon & OSINT4web2-recon, offensive-osint, subdomain
Workflow, reporting & specialized11methodology, triage-validation, evidence-hygiene, VRT-aware reporting

Full searchable catalog → docs/skills.md. Also ships 15 slash commands (/hunt, /recon, /report, …) and a deterministic engagement engine (engine/) that maps a target's attack surface and routes each finding to the skill that handles it.


How it works

A 6-phase, non-linear workflow — recon → map & rank → hunt → validate → report — with scope enforced in code and a 7-Question Gate before anything is submitted. Two ways to drive it:

  • Plain English — describe what you're testing and the relevant skill loads automatically.
  • /hunt scaffold + cbh CLI — engagement-folder structure, state, and orchestration.

→ Usage guide & worked example · 6-phase architecture & skill-to-phase map · cbh CLI


Authorization

These skills are intended for assets you own or have written authorization to assess (bug-bounty in-scope assets, pentest engagement letters, CTF challenges, your own infrastructure).

The skills include validation gates that auto-trigger when you point Claude at unverified third-party targets — triage-validation's 7-Question Gate explicitly asks whether the asset is in scope (Q3) and on the program's accepted-impact list (Q2). The bugcrowd-reporting skill includes researcher-side hygiene (Bugcrowdninja alias, account-state restoration, friendly-tester posture) that signals legitimate authorized testing to the target's fraud team.

The bundle explicitly excludes: weaponizing 0-days against unauthorized targets, post-exploitation tooling, malware development, mass-targeting infrastructure. See SECURITY.md for the full posture.

Heads-up — Anthropic runtime cyber safeguards. Anthropic's models apply real-time safeguards that block "vulnerability exploitation or offensive security tooling development" by default — so even authorized, in-scope work can hit a refusal that isn't this bundle's doing. If you do authorized offensive security (pentest / bug bounty / red team), enroll in Anthropic's free, application-based Cyber Verification Program (CVP) to get safeguards adjusted for legitimate dual-use work. (Mass data exfiltration and ransomware development stay prohibited and are not adjustable.) Details: Anthropic — real-time cyber safeguards.

Why your model switched mid-session

Separate from refusals, and easy to miss. On Opus 5, a narrow set of higher-risk cyber requests — Anthropic names exploit generation, binary-based vulnerability scanning and penetration testing — fall back to Opus 4.8 rather than being refused. You get a notice and the response is labelled with the model that answered, but in a long agentic run that is easy to scroll past, so it can look like Opus 5 quietly got worse. See why Claude switched models.

What to do depends on what you are actually doing:

SituationWhat helps
Auditing your own code — reviewing a repo you own for defectsSay so. "Defensive review of my own repo", "check this against the OWASP Top 10", "secure refactor to remediate" describe the work accurately and read as remediation. This is not a workaround; the work genuinely is defensive.
Authorized offensive work — live engagement, PoC for a bounty submissionThis is what the bundle is for, and the supported route is CVP. Do not reword an offensive engagement to look defensive to get past a classifier — enroll instead.
You just want the switching offSettings → Capabilities disables automatic model switching.

/hunt states the engagement frame (authorized, scope-bounded, remediable finding) on its first turn for exactly this reason — engagement context belongs in the session explicitly, not implied.


Documentation

DocContents
README.mdThis file — overview, quickstart, scope, skill summary
INSTALL.mdFull setup with Burp MCP integration and optional skill regenerator
USAGE.mdWorkflow walkthrough · decision tree · worked engagement example
docs/architecture.md6-phase architecture · skill-to-phase mapping · engagement composition
docs/cbh-cli.mdcbh CLI — native runner orchestrating recon + classify + triage + report
docs/cve-coverage.mdCISA KEV coverage snapshot — refreshed weekly via the workflow template at docs/automation/cve-refresh.yml.template
docs/credits.mdFull attribution: 43 original skills + 8 vendored from upstream
CONTRIBUTING.mdPR guidelines · skill quality standards · scope
SECURITY.mdAuthorized-use posture · responsible disclosure · what's excluded
LICENSEMIT

Why this exists

Most bug-hunting Claude setups are either too generic (one big "security" prompt) or too fragmented (you bookmark 30 disclosed reports and re-read them every engagement). Neither scales past the second target.

This bundle was built and validated through authorized engagements that exposed different capability gaps:

Bug-bounty engagement — surfaced four gaps a starter 3-skill stack could not close:

  1. No hypothesis discipline — drafts written before validation → wasted hours, hurt validity ratio
  2. No per-program reporting tactics — VRT defaults auto-downgraded P3-worthy findings to P4
  3. No engagement coordination — findings, evidence, and submission IDs scattered across folders
  4. No evidence hygiene — screenshots leaked cookies and victim PII

External red-team engagement — exposed five additional gaps that bug-bounty defaults made worse:

  1. Conservative defaults retracted real findings — WAPT mindset stopped tests early on defended targets where red-team continuation would have surfaced bypass chains → redteam-mindset
  2. No mid-engagement situational awareness — client SOC patched confirmed SQLi within 30 min; external attacker locked 14 accounts during a live test session — both invisible without explicit detection methodology → mid-engagement-ir-detection
  3. No enterprise-platform attack chains — M365 + Entra ID, on-prem SharePoint, Cisco SSL VPN, vCenter, and 7 Android APKs all needed current 2024-2026 CVE knowledge and platform-specific tradecraft → m365-entra-attack, okta-attack, hunt-sharepoint, hunt-aspnet, hunt-ntlm-info, vmware-vcenter-attack, enterprise-vpn-attack, apk-redteam-pipeline
  4. No client-facing deliverable format — bug-bounty report templates don't fit enterprise red-team where output is a 50KB+ MD + DOCX with embedded screenshots → redteam-report-template
  5. No post-credential escalation model — when recon yielded credentials (AWS keys, JWTs, GCP JSON), it was unclear what they granted or how to escalate → cloud-iam-deep

The per-class hunt-* skills address gap-zero ("what should I look for in webapps") — the original 24 codifying patterns from 681 disclosed HackerOne reports, with 20+ framework/surface skills added by the community v3 expansion — Claude knows the actual chain templates real triagers paid for, not abstract OWASP Top 10. The enterprise-platform and red-team-tradecraft layers address what bug-bounty alone cannot: external red-team engagements against monitored enterprise targets.


Roadmap

  • HackerOne MCP integration (currently only Burp MCP wired in)
  • Per-engagement memory layer — pattern recall across targets
  • Industry-specific hunt skills — hunt-fintech-graphql, hunt-healthcare-fhir, hunt-gov-compliance
  • Program-rules-parser skill — auto-generate structured scope.md from program text
  • Refresh hunt-* skills with newer disclosed reports (re-run public-skills-builder)
  • Additional enterprise-platform skills — citrix-netscaler-deep, f5-bigip-attack, ad-cs-attack (AD Certificate Services)
  • Refresh enterprise-VPN CVE matrix quarterly to track 2026 advisories
  • Update architecture SVG to include the 7-skill enterprise-platform layer

Sponsors

Atlas Cloud

Atlas Cloud is a full-modal AI inference platform that gives developers a single AI API to access video generation, image generation, and LLM APIs. Instead of managing multiple vendor integrations, you connect once and get unified access to 300+ curated models across all modalities.

Check out Atlas Cloud's new coding plan promotion for more budget-friendly API access: https://www.atlascloud.ai/console/coding-plan


About

Operational tradecraft accumulated across bug-bounty engagements and authorized pentests, codified into Claude skills. Platform-agnostic — slot into any engagement workflow you already use, or none.

Author: ElementalSoul · GenAI Security Research

Sister project: Claude-OSINT — paired skills for the recon phase that this bundle picks up after. Its two recon skills (offensive-osint, osint-methodology) are canonically maintained here and re-exported there, so the two are byte-identical. Installing both is safe: each bundle's installer (install.sh on macOS/Linux, install.ps1 on Windows) records a manifest, the script skips re-copying an identical skill, and --uninstall keeps any skill the other bundle still owns — uninstalling one never breaks the other.

Vendored foundation: shuvonsec/claude-bug-bounty — methodology, validation, reporting, payload library (8 of 82 skills + 15 slash commands)

Generator tool used (not vendored): shuvonsec/public-skills-builder — used to scaffold per-class skills from H1 disclosed reports

Inspirations:

Tool inventory:

License: MIT — use freely, attribution appreciated.


"Give Claude the right skill and it stops being a chatbot. It becomes an operator."

DevOps 与部署数据与 AI

高风险

  • 来源需自行核对维护者身份。
  • 包含脚本或命令调用,安装前请复核。
  • 可能需要外部 token、网络权限或第三方服务。
  • 存在潜在风险命令,请谨慎安装。
  • 扫描发现:5 条。

Codex — Git Clone 安装

  1. 安装前请先查看来源仓库和风险报告。
  2. 克隆仓库:git clone https://github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter.git
  3. 将 "skills/web2-recon" 文件夹复制到 Codex 的 skills 目录中。
  4. 重启 Codex 让新的 skill 生效。

Codex — 手动复制安装

  1. 安装前请先查看来源仓库和风险报告。
  2. 从源仓库下载 SKILL.md 及相关文件。
  3. 在 Codex 的 skills 目录中创建新文件夹。
  4. 将所有 skill 文件复制到新文件夹中。
  5. 重启 Codex 让新的 skill 生效。

Claude Code — Git Clone 安装

  1. 安装前请先查看来源仓库和风险报告。
  2. 克隆仓库:git clone https://github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter.git
  3. 将 "skills/web2-recon" 文件夹复制到 Claude Code 的 skills 目录中。
  4. 重启 Claude Code 让新的 skill 生效。

Claude Code — 手动复制安装

  1. 安装前请先查看来源仓库和风险报告。
  2. 从源仓库下载 SKILL.md 及相关文件。
  3. 在 Claude Code 的 skills 目录中创建新文件夹。
  4. 将所有 skill 文件复制到新文件夹中。
  5. 重启 Claude Code 让新的 skill 生效。

Cursor — Git Clone 安装

  1. 安装前请先查看来源仓库和风险报告。
  2. 克隆仓库:git clone https://github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter.git
  3. 将 "skills/web2-recon" 文件夹复制到 Cursor 的 skills 目录中。
  4. 重启 Cursor 让新的 skill 生效。

Cursor — 手动复制安装

  1. 安装前请先查看来源仓库和风险报告。
  2. 从源仓库下载 SKILL.md 及相关文件。
  3. 在 Cursor 的 skills 目录中创建新文件夹。
  4. 将所有 skill 文件复制到新文件夹中。
  5. 重启 Cursor 让新的 skill 生效。

GitHub Copilot — Git Clone 安装

  1. 安装前请先查看来源仓库和风险报告。
  2. 克隆仓库:git clone https://github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter.git
  3. 将 "skills/web2-recon" 文件夹复制到 GitHub Copilot 的 skills 目录中。
  4. 重启 GitHub Copilot 让新的 skill 生效。

GitHub Copilot — 手动复制安装

  1. 安装前请先查看来源仓库和风险报告。
  2. 从源仓库下载 SKILL.md 及相关文件。
  3. 在 GitHub Copilot 的 skills 目录中创建新文件夹。
  4. 将所有 skill 文件复制到新文件夹中。
  5. 重启 GitHub Copilot 让新的 skill 生效。

Windsurf — Git Clone 安装

  1. 安装前请先查看来源仓库和风险报告。
  2. 克隆仓库:git clone https://github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter.git
  3. 将 "skills/web2-recon" 文件夹复制到 Windsurf 的 skills 目录中。
  4. 重启 Windsurf 让新的 skill 生效。

Windsurf — 手动复制安装

  1. 安装前请先查看来源仓库和风险报告。
  2. 从源仓库下载 SKILL.md 及相关文件。
  3. 在 Windsurf 的 skills 目录中创建新文件夹。
  4. 将所有 skill 文件复制到新文件夹中。
  5. 重启 Windsurf 让新的 skill 生效。
查看 SKILL.md 原文
name: web2-recon
description: Web2 recon pipeline — subdomain enumeration (subfinder, Chaos API, assetfinder), live host discovery (dnsx, httpx), URL crawling (katana, waybackurls, gau), directory fuzzing (ffuf), JS analysis (LinkFinder, SecretFinder), continuous monitoring (new subdomain alerts, JS change detection, GitHub commit watch). Use when starting recon on any web2 target or when asked about asset discovery, subdomain enum, or attack surface mapping.

WEB2 RECON PIPELINE

Full asset discovery from nothing to a prioritized URL list ready for hunting.


SETUP (one-time)

# 1. Set your Chaos API key (get free key at chaos.projectdiscovery.io)
export CHAOS_API_KEY="your-key-here"
# Add to ~/.zshrc or ~/.bashrc for persistence:
echo 'export CHAOS_API_KEY="your-key-here"' >> ~/.zshrc

# 2. Update nuclei templates (run weekly)
nuclei -update-templates

# 3. Configure subfinder with API keys for more sources
mkdir -p ~/.config/subfinder
cat > ~/.config/subfinder/config.yaml << 'EOF'
# Get free keys at: virustotal.com, securitytrails.com, censys.io, shodan.io
virustotal: [YOUR_VT_KEY]
securitytrails: [YOUR_ST_KEY]
censys_apiid: YOUR_CENSYS_ID
censys_secret: YOUR_CENSYS_SECRET
shodan: [YOUR_SHODAN_KEY]
EOF

# 4. Verify all tools installed
which subfinder httpx dnsx nuclei katana waybackurls gau dalfox ffuf anew gf interactsh-client

THE 5-MINUTE RULE

If a target shows nothing interesting after 5 minutes of recon, move on. Don't burn hours on dead surface.

5-minute kill signals:

  • All subdomains return 403 or static marketing pages
  • No API endpoints visible in URLs
  • No JavaScript bundles with interesting endpoint paths
  • nuclei returns 0 medium/high findings
  • No forms, no authentication, no user data

STANDARD RECON PIPELINE

Pre-Hunt: Always Run First

TARGET="target.com"

# Step 0: Passive — crt.sh certificate transparency (no API key needed)
curl -s "https://crt.sh/?q=%.${TARGET}&output=json" \
  | jq -r '.[].name_value' \
  | sed 's/\*\.//g' \
  | sort -u > /tmp/subs.txt
echo "[+] crt.sh: $(wc -l < /tmp/subs.txt) subdomains"

# Step 1: Chaos API (ProjectDiscovery — most comprehensive source)
curl -s "https://dns.projectdiscovery.io/dns/$TARGET/subdomains" \
  -H "Authorization: $CHAOS_API_KEY" \
  | jq -r '.[]' >> /tmp/subs.txt

echo "[+] Chaos returned $(wc -l < /tmp/subs.txt) subdomains"

# Step 2: subfinder (passive multi-source)
subfinder -d $TARGET -silent | anew /tmp/subs.txt
assetfinder --subs-only $TARGET | anew /tmp/subs.txt

echo "[+] Total subdomains after all sources: $(wc -l < /tmp/subs.txt)"

# Step 3: DNS resolution + live host check
cat /tmp/subs.txt | dnsx -silent | httpx -silent -status-code -title -tech-detect | tee /tmp/live.txt

echo "[+] Live hosts: $(wc -l < /tmp/live.txt)"

# Step 4: URL crawl
cat /tmp/live.txt | awk '{print $1}' | katana -d 3 -jc -kf all -silent | anew /tmp/urls.txt

# Step 5: Historical URLs
echo $TARGET | waybackurls | anew /tmp/urls.txt
gau $TARGET --subs | anew /tmp/urls.txt

echo "[+] Total URLs: $(wc -l < /tmp/urls.txt)"

# Step 6: Nuclei scan
nuclei -l /tmp/live.txt -t ~/nuclei-templates/ -severity critical,high,medium -o /tmp/nuclei.txt

Output to Organized Directory

TARGET="target.com"
RECON_DIR="recon/$TARGET"
mkdir -p $RECON_DIR

# All outputs go here:
/tmp/subs.txt         → $RECON_DIR/subdomains.txt
/tmp/live.txt         → $RECON_DIR/live-hosts.txt
/tmp/urls.txt         → $RECON_DIR/urls.txt
/tmp/nuclei.txt       → $RECON_DIR/nuclei.txt

ATTACK SURFACE TRIAGE

Find Interesting Targets in URL List

# Parameters worth testing
cat /tmp/urls.txt | grep -E "[?&](id|user|file|path|url|redirect|next|src|token|key|api_key)=" | tee /tmp/interesting-params.txt

# API endpoints
cat /tmp/urls.txt | grep -E "/api/|/v1/|/v2/|/v3/|/graphql|/rest/|/gql" | tee /tmp/api-endpoints.txt

# File upload endpoints
cat /tmp/urls.txt | grep -E "upload|file|attachment|document|image|avatar|photo|media" | tee /tmp/uploads.txt

# Admin/internal paths
cat /tmp/urls.txt | grep -E "/admin|/internal|/debug|/test|/staging|/dev|/management|/console" | tee /tmp/admin-paths.txt

# Authentication endpoints
cat /tmp/urls.txt | grep -E "/oauth|/login|/auth|/sso|/saml|/oidc|/callback|/token" | tee /tmp/auth-paths.txt

gf Patterns (Quick Classification)

# Install gf patterns: https://github.com/tomnomnom/gf
cat /tmp/urls.txt | gf xss | tee /tmp/xss-candidates.txt
cat /tmp/urls.txt | gf ssrf | tee /tmp/ssrf-candidates.txt
cat /tmp/urls.txt | gf idor | tee /tmp/idor-candidates.txt
cat /tmp/urls.txt | gf sqli | tee /tmp/sqli-candidates.txt
cat /tmp/urls.txt | gf redirect | tee /tmp/redirect-candidates.txt
cat /tmp/urls.txt | gf lfi | tee /tmp/lfi-candidates.txt
cat /tmp/urls.txt | gf rce | tee /tmp/rce-candidates.txt

JS ANALYSIS

SecretFinder (API keys, tokens in JS bundles)

# Activate venv
source ~/tools/SecretFinder/.venv/bin/activate

# Scan a single JS file
python3 ~/tools/SecretFinder/SecretFinder.py -i "https://target.com/static/js/main.js" -o cli

# Scan all JS URLs found in recon
cat /tmp/urls.txt | grep "\.js$" | head -50 | while read url; do
  echo "=== $url ==="
  python3 ~/tools/SecretFinder/SecretFinder.py -i "$url" -o cli 2>/dev/null
done

deactivate

LinkFinder (Endpoints hidden in JS)

source ~/tools/LinkFinder/.venv/bin/activate

# Single JS file
python3 ~/tools/LinkFinder/linkfinder.py -i "https://target.com/app.js" -o cli

# All pages (crawls JS from HTML)
python3 ~/tools/LinkFinder/linkfinder.py -i "https://target.com" -d -o cli

deactivate

DIRECTORY FUZZING

ffuf — Standard Fuzzing

# Directory discovery on a live host
ffuf -u "https://target.com/FUZZ" \
     -w ~/wordlists/common.txt \
     -mc 200,201,204,301,302,307,401,403 \
     -ac \
     -t 40 \
     -o /tmp/ffuf-dirs.json

# API endpoint discovery
ffuf -u "https://target.com/api/FUZZ" \
     -w ~/wordlists/api-endpoints.txt \
     -mc 200,201,204,301,302 \
     -ac \
     -t 20

# IDOR fuzzing with authenticated request
# Create req.txt with Authorization: Bearer TOKEN
ffuf -request /tmp/req.txt \
     -request-proto https \
     -w <(seq 1 10000) \
     -fc 404 \
     -ac \
     -t 10

TARGET SCORING — GO / NO-GO

Score before spending time. Skip if score < 4.

CriterionPoints
Max bounty >= $5K+2
Large user base (>100K) or handles money+2
Program launched < 60 days ago+2
Complex features: API, OAuth, file upload, GraphQL+1
Recent code/feature changes (GitHub, changelog)+1
Private program (less competition)+1
Tech stack you know+1
Source code available+1
Prior disclosed reports to study+1

< 4: Skip 4-5: Only if nothing better available 6-8: Good — spend 1-3 days >= 9: Excellent — spend up to 1 week

Pre-Dive Hard Kill Signals

  1. Max bounty < $500 → not worth your time
  2. All recent reports are N/A or duplicate → hunters saturated it
  3. Scope is only a static marketing page → no attack surface
  4. Company < 5 employees with no revenue → won't pay
  5. Explicitly excludes your planned bug class in rules

TECH STACK DETECTION (2 min)

# Response headers reveal backend
curl -sI https://target.com | grep -iE "server|x-powered-by|x-aspnet|x-runtime|x-generator"

# Common signals:
# Server: nginx + X-Powered-By: PHP/7.4 → PHP backend
# Server: gunicorn OR X-Powered-By: Express → Python/Node.js
# X-Powered-By: ASP.NET → .NET
# Server: Apache Tomcat → Java
# X-Runtime: Ruby → Ruby on Rails

# Framework from JS bundle paths:
# /_next/static/ → Next.js
# /static/js/main.chunk.js → CRA (React)
# /packs/ → Ruby on Rails + Webpacker
# /__nuxt/ → Nuxt.js (Vue)

Stack → Primary Bug Class Map

StackHunt FirstHunt Second
Ruby on RailsMass assignmentIDOR (:id routes)
DjangoIDOR (ModelViewSet, no object perms)SSTI (mark_safe)
FlaskSSTI (render_template_string)SSRF (requests lib)
LaravelMass assignment ($fillable)IDOR (Eloquent, no ownership)
Express (Node.js)Prototype pollutionPath traversal
Spring BootActuator endpoints (/actuator/env)SSTI (Thymeleaf)
ASP.NETViewState deserializationOpen redirect (ReturnUrl)
Next.jsSSRF via Server ActionsOpen redirect via redirect()
GraphQLIntrospection → auth bypass on mutationsIDOR via node(id:)
WordPressPlugin SQLiREST API auth bypass

CONTINUOUS MONITORING SETUP

Set up once per target. Alerts you before other hunters.

New Subdomain Alerts (daily cron)

#!/bin/bash
TARGET="target.com"
KNOWN="/tmp/$TARGET-subs-known.txt"

subfinder -d $TARGET -silent > /tmp/$TARGET-subs-fresh.txt
curl -s "https://dns.projectdiscovery.io/dns/$TARGET/subdomains" \
  -H "Authorization: $CHAOS_API_KEY" \
  | jq -r '.[]' >> /tmp/$TARGET-subs-fresh.txt

# Diff against known
NEW=$(comm -23 <(sort /tmp/$TARGET-subs-fresh.txt) <(sort $KNOWN 2>/dev/null))

if [ -n "$NEW" ]; then
  echo "NEW SUBDOMAINS: $NEW"
  echo "$NEW" >> $KNOWN
fi

# Schedule: crontab -e → 0 8 * * * /bin/bash ~/monitors/subs-watch.sh

GitHub Commit Watch

#!/bin/bash
REPO="TargetOrg/target-app"
LAST_SHA="/tmp/$REPO-last-sha.txt"

CURRENT=$(curl -s "https://api.github.com/repos/$REPO/commits?per_page=1" | jq -r '.[0].sha')
KNOWN=$(cat $LAST_SHA 2>/dev/null)

if [ "$CURRENT" != "$KNOWN" ]; then
  echo "New commit on $REPO: $CURRENT"
  echo $CURRENT > $LAST_SHA
  # Get changed files
  curl -s "https://api.github.com/repos/$REPO/commits/$CURRENT" \
    | jq -r '.files[].filename' | grep -E "auth|middleware|route|permission|role|admin"
fi

# Schedule: */30 * * * * /bin/bash ~/monitors/github-watch.sh

PORT SCANNING (often skipped — don't skip)

# naabu — fast port scanner from ProjectDiscovery
# Finds non-standard ports: 8080, 8443, 3000, 8888, 9000, etc.
cat /tmp/live.txt | awk '{print $1}' | naabu -port 80,443,8080,8443,3000,4000,5000,8000,8888,9000,9090,9200,6379 -silent | tee /tmp/open-ports.txt

# Why this matters: admin panels, debug services, internal APIs often run on alt ports
# Example wins: :8080/actuator/env (Spring Boot), :9200/_cat/indices (Elasticsearch), :6379 (Redis)

SECRET SCANNING IN JS BUNDLES

# trufflehog — high-signal secret detection with entropy analysis
# Scans JS files and git repos
pip install trufflehog3 2>/dev/null || true
trufflehog filesystem --only-verified recon/$TARGET/ 2>/dev/null

# SecretFinder — manual JS bundle scan (already in tools/)
source ~/tools/SecretFinder/.venv/bin/activate
cat /tmp/urls.txt | grep "\.js$" | head -100 | while read url; do
  python3 ~/tools/SecretFinder/SecretFinder.py -i "$url" -o cli 2>/dev/null
done
deactivate

# Quick grep for common patterns in downloaded JS
wget -q -r -l 1 -A "*.js" -P /tmp/js-files/ "https://$TARGET" 2>/dev/null
grep -rn "api_key\|apiKey\|client_secret\|access_token\|private_key\|AWS_SECRET\|AKIA" /tmp/js-files/ 2>/dev/null

GITHUB DORKING FOR TARGET

# Search GitHub for hardcoded secrets before hunting the app
TARGET_ORG="TargetOrgName"  # Check their GitHub org

# Useful dorks (search on github.com):
# org:TARGET_ORG password
# org:TARGET_ORG api_key
# org:TARGET_ORG "Authorization: Bearer"
# org:TARGET_ORG .env
# org:TARGET_ORG "BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY"

# CLI with gh (GitHub CLI):
gh search code "api_key" --owner "$TARGET_ORG" --json path,repository 2>/dev/null | jq '.'
gh search code "password" --owner "$TARGET_ORG" --json path,repository 2>/dev/null | head -20

# GitDorker (if installed):
python3 ~/tools/GitDorker/GitDorker.py -t GITHUB_TOKEN -d ~/tools/GitDorker/Dorks/alldorksv3 -q "$TARGET" -org

30-MINUTE RECON PROTOCOL

Minutes 0-5: Read Program Page

Note:
- ALL in-scope assets (every domain listed)
- Out-of-scope list (read carefully — common trap)
- Safe harbor statement
- Impact types accepted (some exclude "low")
- Average bounty amount (signals program generosity)

Minutes 5-15: Asset Discovery

Run the standard pipeline above. Focus on live.txt output.

Minutes 15-25: Surface Map

Run gf patterns and the interesting-params grep above.

Minutes 25-30: Manual Exploration

Open Burp Suite. Browse the app with proxy on:

  1. Register an account
  2. Perform main user actions (create/read/update/delete resources)
  3. Note all API calls in Burp history
  4. Look for endpoints not in your URL list

After 30 min: Prioritize

Priority 1: API endpoints with ID parameters → IDOR candidates
Priority 2: File upload features → XSS/RCE candidates
Priority 3: OAuth/SSO flows → auth bypass candidates
Priority 4: Search/filter with user input → SQLi/SSRF/SSTI candidates
Priority 5: Admin/debug endpoints → auth bypass candidates

Toolchain fallback (when dnsx / httpx crash)

The projectdiscovery Go binaries (dnsx, httpx, naabu) occasionally SIGSEGV on macOS arm64 due to a cgo / system-resolver interaction. The crash signature is identical regardless of install method — both brew install and go install github.com/projectdiscovery/<tool>@latest produce binaries that segfault at the same address. Smoke-test once before relying on them in a real engagement:

dnsx -version   # if SIGSEGV: use the dig fallback below
httpx -version  # if SIGSEGV: use the curl fallback below

dnsx → dig fallback

# Replaces: dnsx -l subs.txt -a -resp -silent
while read s; do
  ips=$(dig +short +tries=1 +time=3 "$s" \
    | grep -E '^[0-9.]+$' \
    | paste -sd, -)
  [ -n "$ips" ] && echo "$s|$ips"
done < subs.txt

httpx → curl fallback

# Replaces: httpx -l subs.txt -silent -status-code -title -tech-detect
while read s; do
  resp=$(curl -s -L -m 5 -o /tmp/body \
    -w "%{http_code}|%{url_effective}|%{header_server}" \
    "https://$s")
  code=$(echo "$resp" | cut -d'|' -f1)
  if [ "$code" != "000" ]; then
    title=$(grep -oE '<title[^>]*>[^<]*</title>' /tmp/body | head -1 | sed 's/<[^>]*>//g')
    echo "$s|$resp|$title"
  fi
done < subs.txt

Trade-off: Serial vs. concurrent. The fallback handles ~24 subdomains in 14 seconds; the same workload on httpx with default 50 threads finishes in 2-3 seconds. For VDP-scale recon (< 100 subdomains) the fallback is fine. For mass recon (1000+) fix the toolchain first.

Verified against HackerOne's own VDP in docs/verification/recon-hackerone-vdp.md.


API Spec / Swagger / OpenAPI Discovery (2024-2026 surface)

API spec endpoints are the single highest-leverage recon target on any modern .NET / Node / Python / Java backend. The spec discloses every endpoint, HTTP methods, parameter names + types + formats, models, validation rules — a complete attack-map in JSON. Default routes are commonly left enabled in production. Add this wordlist to the directory-fuzzing phase (after the standard common.txt pass).

Default discovery path wordlist (paste into swagger-paths.txt)

# NSwag / Swashbuckle (ASP.NET Core)
/swagger
/swagger/
/swagger/index.html
/swagger/ui/index.html
/swagger/v1/swagger.json
/swagger/v2/swagger.json
/swagger/v3/swagger.json
/swagger/docs/v1
/swagger/docs/v2
/swagger-ui
/swagger-ui/
/swagger-ui.html
/swagger-resources
/swagger-resources/configuration/ui
/nswag
/nswag/index.html
/api/swagger
/api/swagger.json
/api/swagger/v1/swagger.json
/api/openapi
/api/openapi.json
/api/v1/swagger.json
/api/v2/swagger.json
/api-docs
/api-docs/swagger.json

# OpenAPI generic
/openapi
/openapi.json
/openapi.yaml
/openapi.yml
/openapi/v1.json
/openapi/v2.json
/openapi/v3.json
/.well-known/openapi.json

# Java / Spring (Springfox / springdoc)
/v2/api-docs
/v3/api-docs
/v3/api-docs.yaml
/v3/api-docs/swagger-config
/swagger-ui/index.html

# Python (FastAPI / Flask-RESTPlus / Connexion / DRF)
/docs
/docs/
/redoc
/redoc/
/openapi.json
/swagger.json
/swagger/?format=openapi
/swagger.yaml

# Express / Node / Hapi
/api-docs
/api-docs.json
/swagger.json
/swagger-stats
/graphql-docs

# GraphQL adjacent (often co-located)
/graphql
/graphiql
/playground
/altair
/voyager
/graphql/console
/graphql-explorer

# ReDoc / RapiDoc / Stoplight / alt UIs
/redoc
/redoc.html
/redoc-ui.html
/rapidoc
/rapidoc.html
/stoplight
/elements

# Misc / dev-leftover
/actuator
/actuator/openapi
/actuator/mappings
/q/openapi
/q/swagger-ui
/docs/swagger.json
/api/v1/docs
/api/v2/docs
/internal/swagger
/admin/swagger
/management/swagger

Integration with the standard pipeline

# After live-hosts.txt is built (Phase 1 / 2), run:
ffuf -w swagger-paths.txt -u "https://FUZZ.target.com" -mc 200,302 -fs 0 -t 50 -o swagger-hits.json
# Or with httpx for content-aware filtering:
httpx -l live-hosts.txt -path swagger-paths.txt -mc 200 -mr "swagger|openapi" -json | tee swagger-hits.jsonl
# For every hit:
jq '.paths | keys' swagger.json > endpoints.txt
jq '.components.schemas' swagger.json > schemas.json   # mass-assignment field candidates

Why this matters for recon-to-hunting handoff

  • Spec → mass IDOR/BOLA — jq '.paths | keys' swagger.json becomes the input list for Autorize/ffuf per-user testing.
  • Spec → mass-assignment payload construction — components.schemas.UserUpdateDto enumerates isAdmin, emailVerified, tenantId, role.
  • Spec → hidden endpoint discovery — /internal/*, /debug/*, /v0/*, /legacy/* routes documented but never auth-gated.
  • Spec → injection-class seeding — every parameter's type + format + enum + max-length means payloads pass validation before reaching the sink. Especially valuable against ASP.NET Core where the model binder rejects malformed input before any controller logic.

Tools

  • kiterunner — natively ingests OpenAPI spec, generates requests against the API.
  • sj (Swagger Jacker) — purpose-built for Swagger spec exploitation.
  • apidetector (brinhosa) — Swagger-UI mass scanner.
  • XSSwagger (vavkamil) — detects vulnerable Swagger UI versions (CVE-2018-25031 family).
  • nuclei -t http/exposures/apis/ — built-in templates for default spec paths.

Anti-pattern reminder

A 404/403 on /swagger does NOT mean no spec is exposed. Many .NET projects route the spec under /api/swagger/v1/swagger.json rather than /swagger. Always test the full path list, not just the root.

Full attack-chain analysis is in hunt-api-misconfig → NSwag / Swagger / OpenAPI Spec Exposure.


Related Skills & Chains

  • offensive-osint — When recon needs concrete probes / wordlists / regexes beyond the basic pipeline. Workflow primitive: this skill produces the URL set; offensive-osint provides the secret regexes, GraphQL/Swagger paths, and identity-fabric probes you apply to that URL set.
  • osint-methodology — When you need a severity rubric for what you discovered. Workflow primitive: after recon outputs subdomains.txt / live-hosts.txt / urls.txt, score each asset against osint-methodology's findings rubric to decide what gets a finding versus what stays in the asset graph.
  • hunt-subdomain — When recon surfaces stale CNAMEs / dangling DNS. Workflow primitive: any subdomain in subdomains.txt whose CNAME points to S3 / GitHub Pages / Heroku / Shopify / Azure should auto-route to hunt-subdomain for takeover validation.
  • security-arsenal — When the URL set is classified by gf and ready for active testing. Workflow primitive: gf xss/ssrf/sqli/idor output names become payload-class queries against security-arsenal's payload library.
  • bb-methodology — When recon completes and Phase 1 transitions to Phase 2 (Mapping). Workflow primitive: hand the live host + URL set back to bb-methodology Phase 2 for endpoint mapping and Phase 3 vulnerability discovery routing.

Operator Notes (Claude-BugHunter)

Engagement-derived + 2026-specific additions to the vendored foundation. Wisdom from real authorized engagements + Phase 2 verification across this repo's 31+ skill-area live tests. The upstream pipeline covers the WHAT; this layer covers the WHEN-IT-WORKS-vs-WHEN-IT-DOESN'T.

Cross-TLD pivot discipline

Phase 2C's HackerOne VDP recon walked from hackerone.com (24 subdomains) into a sister TLD hacker.one (12 more subdomains found in JS bundle references). Operators who only enumerate *.target.com miss attack surface that the target legitimately operates on a different domain.

Always grep JS bundles for plausible sibling TLDs:

# pull all JS, grep for sibling-TLD candidates
for url in $(cat live-hosts.txt); do
  curl -s "$url" | grep -oE 'src="[^"]+\.js"' | sed 's/src="//;s/"//'
done | sort -u > js-urls.txt

# then on each JS file
for j in $(cat js-urls.txt); do
  curl -s "$j" | grep -oE '[a-z0-9.-]+\.(io|app|one|dev|test|cloud|ai|co)' | sort -u
done | sort -u > sibling-tld-candidates.txt

Common sibling-TLD patterns: target.com → target.io / target.app / target.one / target.dev / target.test / target-corp.com / target-cdn.net. Always validate via WHOIS or by checking if the cert chain trusts the same internal CA before treating the sister TLD as in-scope.

Subdomain wordlist priorities by 2026

Top discovery prefixes by hit rate against enterprise VDPs in our 2024-2026 corpus:

mta-sts.*          api.*              docs.*
dev-*              staging-*          *-qa
*-stage            *-uat              events.*
portal.*           customer.*         partner.*
vendor.*           internal-*         admin-*
employee-*         hr.*               jobs.*
sso.*              auth.*             id.*

Internal-looking subdomains often expose more surface than the marketing site — partner.target.com and vendor-portal.target.com frequently have weaker auth than the main app because they're scoped for "trusted" external users. Always send a probe to the long-tail wordlist after the standard subfinder run completes.

Live-host probe: how to fingerprint stack quickly

curl -sI <host> headers are 80% of the fingerprint:

  • Server: — apache / nginx / cloudflare / kestrel (= .NET Core) / openresty / envoy
  • X-Powered-By: — PHP version, ASP.NET version, Express.js
  • X-Drupal-Cache, X-Generator: Drupal 9 — Drupal
  • X-Generator: WordPress — WordPress
  • Via: — CDN chain (1.1 varnish, 1.1 cloudfront)
  • Set-Cookie: names — JSESSIONID (Java), PHPSESSID (PHP), ASP.NET_SessionId (.NET), connect.sid (Express), laravel_session (Laravel)

JS bundle filename patterns:

  • /_next/static/ = Next.js
  • /_nuxt/ = Nuxt
  • /assets/static/ with hash filenames = Vite
  • /static/js/main.*.chunk.js = Create React App
  • runtime.*.js + polyfills.*.js + main.*.js = Angular CLI

The first 10s of recon should yield a stack guess; the rest is targeting. If your fingerprint contradicts itself (Server says nginx, Set-Cookie says ASP.NET) you've found a reverse proxy front-end — note the origin app for later smuggling/cache attacks.

GitHub Pages 404 vs takeover signal

Critical distinction operators get wrong:

  • "Page not found · GitHub Pages" with HTTP 404 means the repo EXISTS — NOT a takeover.
  • "There isn't a GitHub Pages site here" means the repo was deleted — TAKEOVER candidate.

Same distinction for CloudFront:

  • "Error - 404" with Server: CloudFront = distribution exists, origin returned 404 — NOT a takeover.
  • "The request could not be satisfied" with X-Cache: Error from cloudfront = origin missing entirely — potential takeover.

Phase 2C verified both patterns live. Always check the EXACT response body string before filing a takeover finding — the takeover-scanner tools (subzy, subjack) match on multiple fingerprints and frequently false-positive on the "still owned, just empty" case.

Toolchain fallback

Already covered in this file's Phase 2C addition. Quick reminder: dnsx/httpx may segfault on macOS arm64; the dig+curl fallback works for < 100-host runs in ~14 seconds. Don't burn an hour debugging Go binary panics when the fallback gets you to the same URL set.

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