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A self-contained Claude skill bundle for bug hunting and external red-team work · 82 skills · 15...
用 Codex 或 Claude 安装复制这段 Prompt,粘贴到 Codex、Claude 或其他助手里,让它先审查 Skill 页面再帮你安装。
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来源文件:README.md
A self-contained Claude skill bundle for bug hunting and external red-team work · 82 skills · 15 slash commands · 681 disclosed-report patterns across 24 core vulnerability classes · enterprise identity + infrastructure attack matrices · engagement-folder scaffolding · Burp MCP integration · battle-tested across authorized red-team and bug-hunting engagements, plus public training platforms (DVWA, OWASP Juice Shop, Hacker101, testphp.vulnweb.com).
Built by Sachin Sharma — Bug Hunting & GenAI Security Research.
claude-bughunter is a drop-in skill bundle for the Claude Code skills system. Install once and Claude Code stops being a chatbot and starts behaving like a senior bug-hunting researcher or red-team operator: it knows the techniques, the chain templates, the VRT mappings, the platform CVE chains, and the hygiene — and it stays in scope.
Four layers stack:
bb-methodology + redteam-mindset: the 5-phase non-linear workflow, critical-thinking framework, and red-team operator discipline.hunt-* skills curated from 681 disclosed HackerOne reports: per-class detection patterns, payloads, bypass tables, and chain templates.triage-validation + reporting + evidence-hygiene: the 7-Question Gate, VRT-aware severity, OOS rebuttals, PII redaction, and red-team deliverables.All triggered automatically by topic — describe what you're testing in plain English and the relevant skill loads. No invocation by name.
Option A — install as a Claude Code plugin (recommended). From inside Claude Code:
/plugin marketplace add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter
/plugin install claude-bughunter@elementalsouls
All 82 skills + 15 commands load namespaced under claude-bughunter: and update when you bump the plugin version — no files copied into ~/.claude/.
Option B — copy install (no plugin system / pin to a clone):
git clone https://github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter.git
cd Claude-BugHunter
# macOS / Linux
bash scripts/install.sh
# Windows (PowerShell)
pwsh ./scripts/install.ps1
Both copy the skills + commands into ~/.claude/ (macOS/Linux) or %USERPROFILE%\.claude\ (Windows) and wire the hunt engagement scaffolder.
What each install path gives you:
| Path | 82 skills + 15 slash commands | cbh CLI | hunt scaffolder |
|---|---|---|---|
| A — plugin | ✅ namespaced under claude-bughunter: | ➕ separate pipx install | ❌ clone-only |
| B — copy install | ✅ copied into ~/.claude/ | ✅ from the clone | ✅ from the clone |
The plugin is the fastest path to the skills + slash commands. The terminal-native
cbh runner installs standalone — pipx install git+https://github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter
— so plugin users can add it without a full clone (see cbh CLI).
The hunt engagement scaffolder ships with the clone (Option B).
That's it. Open Claude Code and describe what you're testing in plain English — the right skill loads automatically, no invocation by name:
> Testing acme.com — an in-scope HackerOne target. Run recon and rank the surface.
⟳ loading skills: web2-recon, offensive-osint, bb-methodology …
→ subdomain enum (subfinder + crt.sh) … 47 hosts
→ live hosts (httpx) … 12 · tech fingerprint … 6 distinct stacks
→ ranked surface: api.acme.com (GraphQL, introspection ON) ← start here
auth.acme.com (OAuth, SSO) ← hunt-oauth
Next: want me to probe the GraphQL introspection + OAuth redirect_uri?
→ Full Installation guide · Usage guide · searchable skill catalog.
The block above is an illustrative transcript. To record a real demo of your own session:
asciinema rec demo.cast→ upload to asciinema.org and drop the badge here.
The skills are plain Agent Skills — the same SKILL.md format that Claude Code · OpenCode · OpenAI Codex CLI · Hermes Agent all load. One command installs them everywhere:
# macOS / Linux
bash scripts/install.sh --all --burp-mcp
# Windows (PowerShell)
pwsh ./scripts/install.ps1 -All -BurpMcp
--all (-All) copies the skills to every harness's path (~/.claude/skills, ~/.agents/skills, ~/.hermes/skills); --burp-mcp (-BurpMcp) wires the Burp MCP server into each. The full knowledge layer ports to all four — the slash commands and /hunt engine stay Claude-Code-only by design.
Chart is self-hosted — regenerate with python3 scripts/gen_star_history.py (needs gh auth login).
Refreshes automatically each Monday via .github/workflows/star-history.yml.
This bundle covers the external attack surface — anything reachable from the internet without first compromising an internal endpoint.
If you're running an internal red team that includes domain-takeover chains via Kerberos or lateral movement, this bundle won't help you in those phases — and we'd rather say that up front than have you find out mid-engagement. The external surface handoff to internal-RT tooling (Impacket, NetExec, CrackMapExec, Rubeus, Certify, BloodHound) is intentionally outside our scope. Coverage for internal AD and post-exploit may come in a future update.
82 skills, auto-loaded by topic — no invocation by name. Coverage across the external attack surface:
| Category | # | Examples |
|---|---|---|
| Web application hunting | 13 | XSS, SQLi, SSRF, IDOR, LFI, SSTI, XXE, CSRF, CORS, open-redirect |
| Authentication & identity | 7 | auth-bypass, session, OAuth, SAML, MFA-bypass, ATO |
| API & infrastructure | 15 | GraphQL, gRPC, WebSocket, API-misconfig, host-header, RCE |
| Advanced & concurrency | 6 | race-condition, HTTP smuggling, deserialization, cache-poison |
| Framework-specific | 4 | Next.js, Node.js, Laravel, Spring Boot |
| Enterprise identity & cloud ★ | 3 | M365/Entra, Okta, cloud-IAM-deep |
| Infrastructure & appliance ★ | 4 | VMware vCenter, enterprise VPN, SharePoint, ASP.NET/NTLM |
| Red-team tradecraft ★ | 4 | redteam-mindset, APK pipeline, supply-chain recon, mid-engagement IR |
| Recon & OSINT | 4 | web2-recon, offensive-osint, subdomain |
| Workflow, reporting & specialized | 11 | methodology, triage-validation, evidence-hygiene, VRT-aware reporting |
Full searchable catalog → docs/skills.md. Also ships 15 slash commands (/hunt, /recon, /report, …) and a deterministic engagement engine (engine/) that maps a target's attack surface and routes each finding to the skill that handles it.
A 6-phase, non-linear workflow — recon → map & rank → hunt → validate → report — with scope enforced in code and a 7-Question Gate before anything is submitted. Two ways to drive it:
/hunt scaffold + cbh CLI — engagement-folder structure, state, and orchestration.→ Usage guide & worked example · 6-phase architecture & skill-to-phase map · cbh CLI
These skills are intended for assets you own or have written authorization to assess (bug-bounty in-scope assets, pentest engagement letters, CTF challenges, your own infrastructure).
The skills include validation gates that auto-trigger when you point Claude at unverified third-party targets — triage-validation's 7-Question Gate explicitly asks whether the asset is in scope (Q3) and on the program's accepted-impact list (Q2). The bugcrowd-reporting skill includes researcher-side hygiene (Bugcrowdninja alias, account-state restoration, friendly-tester posture) that signals legitimate authorized testing to the target's fraud team.
The bundle explicitly excludes: weaponizing 0-days against unauthorized targets, post-exploitation tooling, malware development, mass-targeting infrastructure. See SECURITY.md for the full posture.
Heads-up — Anthropic runtime cyber safeguards. Anthropic's models apply real-time safeguards that block "vulnerability exploitation or offensive security tooling development" by default — so even authorized, in-scope work can hit a refusal that isn't this bundle's doing. If you do authorized offensive security (pentest / bug bounty / red team), enroll in Anthropic's free, application-based Cyber Verification Program (CVP) to get safeguards adjusted for legitimate dual-use work. (Mass data exfiltration and ransomware development stay prohibited and are not adjustable.) Details: Anthropic — real-time cyber safeguards.
Separate from refusals, and easy to miss. On Opus 5, a narrow set of higher-risk cyber requests — Anthropic names exploit generation, binary-based vulnerability scanning and penetration testing — fall back to Opus 4.8 rather than being refused. You get a notice and the response is labelled with the model that answered, but in a long agentic run that is easy to scroll past, so it can look like Opus 5 quietly got worse. See why Claude switched models.
What to do depends on what you are actually doing:
| Situation | What helps |
|---|---|
| Auditing your own code — reviewing a repo you own for defects | Say so. "Defensive review of my own repo", "check this against the OWASP Top 10", "secure refactor to remediate" describe the work accurately and read as remediation. This is not a workaround; the work genuinely is defensive. |
| Authorized offensive work — live engagement, PoC for a bounty submission | This is what the bundle is for, and the supported route is CVP. Do not reword an offensive engagement to look defensive to get past a classifier — enroll instead. |
| You just want the switching off | Settings → Capabilities disables automatic model switching. |
/hunt states the engagement frame (authorized, scope-bounded, remediable finding) on its first turn
for exactly this reason — engagement context belongs in the session explicitly, not implied.
| Doc | Contents |
|---|---|
README.md | This file — overview, quickstart, scope, skill summary |
INSTALL.md | Full setup with Burp MCP integration and optional skill regenerator |
USAGE.md | Workflow walkthrough · decision tree · worked engagement example |
docs/architecture.md | 6-phase architecture · skill-to-phase mapping · engagement composition |
docs/cbh-cli.md | cbh CLI — native runner orchestrating recon + classify + triage + report |
docs/cve-coverage.md | CISA KEV coverage snapshot — refreshed weekly via the workflow template at docs/automation/cve-refresh.yml.template |
docs/credits.md | Full attribution: 43 original skills + 8 vendored from upstream |
CONTRIBUTING.md | PR guidelines · skill quality standards · scope |
SECURITY.md | Authorized-use posture · responsible disclosure · what's excluded |
LICENSE | MIT |
Most bug-hunting Claude setups are either too generic (one big "security" prompt) or too fragmented (you bookmark 30 disclosed reports and re-read them every engagement). Neither scales past the second target.
This bundle was built and validated through authorized engagements that exposed different capability gaps:
Bug-bounty engagement — surfaced four gaps a starter 3-skill stack could not close:
External red-team engagement — exposed five additional gaps that bug-bounty defaults made worse:
redteam-mindsetmid-engagement-ir-detectionm365-entra-attack, okta-attack, hunt-sharepoint, hunt-aspnet, hunt-ntlm-info, vmware-vcenter-attack, enterprise-vpn-attack, apk-redteam-pipelineredteam-report-templatecloud-iam-deepThe per-class hunt-* skills address gap-zero ("what should I look for in webapps") — the original 24 codifying patterns from 681 disclosed HackerOne reports, with 20+ framework/surface skills added by the community v3 expansion — Claude knows the actual chain templates real triagers paid for, not abstract OWASP Top 10. The enterprise-platform and red-team-tradecraft layers address what bug-bounty alone cannot: external red-team engagements against monitored enterprise targets.
hunt-fintech-graphql, hunt-healthcare-fhir, hunt-gov-compliancescope.md from program texthunt-* skills with newer disclosed reports (re-run public-skills-builder)citrix-netscaler-deep, f5-bigip-attack, ad-cs-attack (AD Certificate Services)Atlas Cloud is a full-modal AI inference platform that gives developers a single AI API to access video generation, image generation, and LLM APIs. Instead of managing multiple vendor integrations, you connect once and get unified access to 300+ curated models across all modalities.
Check out Atlas Cloud's new coding plan promotion for more budget-friendly API access: https://www.atlascloud.ai/console/coding-plan
Operational tradecraft accumulated across bug-bounty engagements and authorized pentests, codified into Claude skills. Platform-agnostic — slot into any engagement workflow you already use, or none.
Author: ElementalSoul · GenAI Security Research
Sister project: Claude-OSINT — paired skills for the recon phase that this bundle picks up after. Its two recon skills (offensive-osint, osint-methodology) are canonically maintained here and re-exported there, so the two are byte-identical. Installing both is safe: each bundle's installer (install.sh on macOS/Linux, install.ps1 on Windows) records a manifest, the script skips re-copying an identical skill, and --uninstall keeps any skill the other bundle still owns — uninstalling one never breaks the other.
Vendored foundation: shuvonsec/claude-bug-bounty — methodology, validation, reporting, payload library (8 of 82 skills + 15 slash commands)
Generator tool used (not vendored): shuvonsec/public-skills-builder — used to scaffold per-class skills from H1 disclosed reports
Inspirations:
trailofbits/skills — skill-authoring disciplinetrilwu/secskills — subagent patternTool inventory:
License: MIT — use freely, attribution appreciated.
"Give Claude the right skill and it stops being a chatbot. It becomes an operator."
name: web2-recon
description: Web2 recon pipeline — subdomain enumeration (subfinder, Chaos API, assetfinder), live host discovery (dnsx, httpx), URL crawling (katana, waybackurls, gau), directory fuzzing (ffuf), JS analysis (LinkFinder, SecretFinder), continuous monitoring (new subdomain alerts, JS change detection, GitHub commit watch). Use when starting recon on any web2 target or when asked about asset discovery, subdomain enum, or attack surface mapping.Full asset discovery from nothing to a prioritized URL list ready for hunting.
# 1. Set your Chaos API key (get free key at chaos.projectdiscovery.io)
export CHAOS_API_KEY="your-key-here"
# Add to ~/.zshrc or ~/.bashrc for persistence:
echo 'export CHAOS_API_KEY="your-key-here"' >> ~/.zshrc
# 2. Update nuclei templates (run weekly)
nuclei -update-templates
# 3. Configure subfinder with API keys for more sources
mkdir -p ~/.config/subfinder
cat > ~/.config/subfinder/config.yaml << 'EOF'
# Get free keys at: virustotal.com, securitytrails.com, censys.io, shodan.io
virustotal: [YOUR_VT_KEY]
securitytrails: [YOUR_ST_KEY]
censys_apiid: YOUR_CENSYS_ID
censys_secret: YOUR_CENSYS_SECRET
shodan: [YOUR_SHODAN_KEY]
EOF
# 4. Verify all tools installed
which subfinder httpx dnsx nuclei katana waybackurls gau dalfox ffuf anew gf interactsh-client
If a target shows nothing interesting after 5 minutes of recon, move on. Don't burn hours on dead surface.
5-minute kill signals:
TARGET="target.com"
# Step 0: Passive — crt.sh certificate transparency (no API key needed)
curl -s "https://crt.sh/?q=%.${TARGET}&output=json" \
| jq -r '.[].name_value' \
| sed 's/\*\.//g' \
| sort -u > /tmp/subs.txt
echo "[+] crt.sh: $(wc -l < /tmp/subs.txt) subdomains"
# Step 1: Chaos API (ProjectDiscovery — most comprehensive source)
curl -s "https://dns.projectdiscovery.io/dns/$TARGET/subdomains" \
-H "Authorization: $CHAOS_API_KEY" \
| jq -r '.[]' >> /tmp/subs.txt
echo "[+] Chaos returned $(wc -l < /tmp/subs.txt) subdomains"
# Step 2: subfinder (passive multi-source)
subfinder -d $TARGET -silent | anew /tmp/subs.txt
assetfinder --subs-only $TARGET | anew /tmp/subs.txt
echo "[+] Total subdomains after all sources: $(wc -l < /tmp/subs.txt)"
# Step 3: DNS resolution + live host check
cat /tmp/subs.txt | dnsx -silent | httpx -silent -status-code -title -tech-detect | tee /tmp/live.txt
echo "[+] Live hosts: $(wc -l < /tmp/live.txt)"
# Step 4: URL crawl
cat /tmp/live.txt | awk '{print $1}' | katana -d 3 -jc -kf all -silent | anew /tmp/urls.txt
# Step 5: Historical URLs
echo $TARGET | waybackurls | anew /tmp/urls.txt
gau $TARGET --subs | anew /tmp/urls.txt
echo "[+] Total URLs: $(wc -l < /tmp/urls.txt)"
# Step 6: Nuclei scan
nuclei -l /tmp/live.txt -t ~/nuclei-templates/ -severity critical,high,medium -o /tmp/nuclei.txt
TARGET="target.com"
RECON_DIR="recon/$TARGET"
mkdir -p $RECON_DIR
# All outputs go here:
/tmp/subs.txt → $RECON_DIR/subdomains.txt
/tmp/live.txt → $RECON_DIR/live-hosts.txt
/tmp/urls.txt → $RECON_DIR/urls.txt
/tmp/nuclei.txt → $RECON_DIR/nuclei.txt
# Parameters worth testing
cat /tmp/urls.txt | grep -E "[?&](id|user|file|path|url|redirect|next|src|token|key|api_key)=" | tee /tmp/interesting-params.txt
# API endpoints
cat /tmp/urls.txt | grep -E "/api/|/v1/|/v2/|/v3/|/graphql|/rest/|/gql" | tee /tmp/api-endpoints.txt
# File upload endpoints
cat /tmp/urls.txt | grep -E "upload|file|attachment|document|image|avatar|photo|media" | tee /tmp/uploads.txt
# Admin/internal paths
cat /tmp/urls.txt | grep -E "/admin|/internal|/debug|/test|/staging|/dev|/management|/console" | tee /tmp/admin-paths.txt
# Authentication endpoints
cat /tmp/urls.txt | grep -E "/oauth|/login|/auth|/sso|/saml|/oidc|/callback|/token" | tee /tmp/auth-paths.txt
# Install gf patterns: https://github.com/tomnomnom/gf
cat /tmp/urls.txt | gf xss | tee /tmp/xss-candidates.txt
cat /tmp/urls.txt | gf ssrf | tee /tmp/ssrf-candidates.txt
cat /tmp/urls.txt | gf idor | tee /tmp/idor-candidates.txt
cat /tmp/urls.txt | gf sqli | tee /tmp/sqli-candidates.txt
cat /tmp/urls.txt | gf redirect | tee /tmp/redirect-candidates.txt
cat /tmp/urls.txt | gf lfi | tee /tmp/lfi-candidates.txt
cat /tmp/urls.txt | gf rce | tee /tmp/rce-candidates.txt
# Activate venv
source ~/tools/SecretFinder/.venv/bin/activate
# Scan a single JS file
python3 ~/tools/SecretFinder/SecretFinder.py -i "https://target.com/static/js/main.js" -o cli
# Scan all JS URLs found in recon
cat /tmp/urls.txt | grep "\.js$" | head -50 | while read url; do
echo "=== $url ==="
python3 ~/tools/SecretFinder/SecretFinder.py -i "$url" -o cli 2>/dev/null
done
deactivate
source ~/tools/LinkFinder/.venv/bin/activate
# Single JS file
python3 ~/tools/LinkFinder/linkfinder.py -i "https://target.com/app.js" -o cli
# All pages (crawls JS from HTML)
python3 ~/tools/LinkFinder/linkfinder.py -i "https://target.com" -d -o cli
deactivate
# Directory discovery on a live host
ffuf -u "https://target.com/FUZZ" \
-w ~/wordlists/common.txt \
-mc 200,201,204,301,302,307,401,403 \
-ac \
-t 40 \
-o /tmp/ffuf-dirs.json
# API endpoint discovery
ffuf -u "https://target.com/api/FUZZ" \
-w ~/wordlists/api-endpoints.txt \
-mc 200,201,204,301,302 \
-ac \
-t 20
# IDOR fuzzing with authenticated request
# Create req.txt with Authorization: Bearer TOKEN
ffuf -request /tmp/req.txt \
-request-proto https \
-w <(seq 1 10000) \
-fc 404 \
-ac \
-t 10
Score before spending time. Skip if score < 4.
| Criterion | Points |
|---|---|
| Max bounty >= $5K | +2 |
| Large user base (>100K) or handles money | +2 |
| Program launched < 60 days ago | +2 |
| Complex features: API, OAuth, file upload, GraphQL | +1 |
| Recent code/feature changes (GitHub, changelog) | +1 |
| Private program (less competition) | +1 |
| Tech stack you know | +1 |
| Source code available | +1 |
| Prior disclosed reports to study | +1 |
< 4: Skip 4-5: Only if nothing better available 6-8: Good — spend 1-3 days >= 9: Excellent — spend up to 1 week
# Response headers reveal backend
curl -sI https://target.com | grep -iE "server|x-powered-by|x-aspnet|x-runtime|x-generator"
# Common signals:
# Server: nginx + X-Powered-By: PHP/7.4 → PHP backend
# Server: gunicorn OR X-Powered-By: Express → Python/Node.js
# X-Powered-By: ASP.NET → .NET
# Server: Apache Tomcat → Java
# X-Runtime: Ruby → Ruby on Rails
# Framework from JS bundle paths:
# /_next/static/ → Next.js
# /static/js/main.chunk.js → CRA (React)
# /packs/ → Ruby on Rails + Webpacker
# /__nuxt/ → Nuxt.js (Vue)
| Stack | Hunt First | Hunt Second |
|---|---|---|
| Ruby on Rails | Mass assignment | IDOR (:id routes) |
| Django | IDOR (ModelViewSet, no object perms) | SSTI (mark_safe) |
| Flask | SSTI (render_template_string) | SSRF (requests lib) |
| Laravel | Mass assignment ($fillable) | IDOR (Eloquent, no ownership) |
| Express (Node.js) | Prototype pollution | Path traversal |
| Spring Boot | Actuator endpoints (/actuator/env) | SSTI (Thymeleaf) |
| ASP.NET | ViewState deserialization | Open redirect (ReturnUrl) |
| Next.js | SSRF via Server Actions | Open redirect via redirect() |
| GraphQL | Introspection → auth bypass on mutations | IDOR via node(id:) |
| WordPress | Plugin SQLi | REST API auth bypass |
Set up once per target. Alerts you before other hunters.
#!/bin/bash
TARGET="target.com"
KNOWN="/tmp/$TARGET-subs-known.txt"
subfinder -d $TARGET -silent > /tmp/$TARGET-subs-fresh.txt
curl -s "https://dns.projectdiscovery.io/dns/$TARGET/subdomains" \
-H "Authorization: $CHAOS_API_KEY" \
| jq -r '.[]' >> /tmp/$TARGET-subs-fresh.txt
# Diff against known
NEW=$(comm -23 <(sort /tmp/$TARGET-subs-fresh.txt) <(sort $KNOWN 2>/dev/null))
if [ -n "$NEW" ]; then
echo "NEW SUBDOMAINS: $NEW"
echo "$NEW" >> $KNOWN
fi
# Schedule: crontab -e → 0 8 * * * /bin/bash ~/monitors/subs-watch.sh
#!/bin/bash
REPO="TargetOrg/target-app"
LAST_SHA="/tmp/$REPO-last-sha.txt"
CURRENT=$(curl -s "https://api.github.com/repos/$REPO/commits?per_page=1" | jq -r '.[0].sha')
KNOWN=$(cat $LAST_SHA 2>/dev/null)
if [ "$CURRENT" != "$KNOWN" ]; then
echo "New commit on $REPO: $CURRENT"
echo $CURRENT > $LAST_SHA
# Get changed files
curl -s "https://api.github.com/repos/$REPO/commits/$CURRENT" \
| jq -r '.files[].filename' | grep -E "auth|middleware|route|permission|role|admin"
fi
# Schedule: */30 * * * * /bin/bash ~/monitors/github-watch.sh
# naabu — fast port scanner from ProjectDiscovery
# Finds non-standard ports: 8080, 8443, 3000, 8888, 9000, etc.
cat /tmp/live.txt | awk '{print $1}' | naabu -port 80,443,8080,8443,3000,4000,5000,8000,8888,9000,9090,9200,6379 -silent | tee /tmp/open-ports.txt
# Why this matters: admin panels, debug services, internal APIs often run on alt ports
# Example wins: :8080/actuator/env (Spring Boot), :9200/_cat/indices (Elasticsearch), :6379 (Redis)
# trufflehog — high-signal secret detection with entropy analysis
# Scans JS files and git repos
pip install trufflehog3 2>/dev/null || true
trufflehog filesystem --only-verified recon/$TARGET/ 2>/dev/null
# SecretFinder — manual JS bundle scan (already in tools/)
source ~/tools/SecretFinder/.venv/bin/activate
cat /tmp/urls.txt | grep "\.js$" | head -100 | while read url; do
python3 ~/tools/SecretFinder/SecretFinder.py -i "$url" -o cli 2>/dev/null
done
deactivate
# Quick grep for common patterns in downloaded JS
wget -q -r -l 1 -A "*.js" -P /tmp/js-files/ "https://$TARGET" 2>/dev/null
grep -rn "api_key\|apiKey\|client_secret\|access_token\|private_key\|AWS_SECRET\|AKIA" /tmp/js-files/ 2>/dev/null
# Search GitHub for hardcoded secrets before hunting the app
TARGET_ORG="TargetOrgName" # Check their GitHub org
# Useful dorks (search on github.com):
# org:TARGET_ORG password
# org:TARGET_ORG api_key
# org:TARGET_ORG "Authorization: Bearer"
# org:TARGET_ORG .env
# org:TARGET_ORG "BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY"
# CLI with gh (GitHub CLI):
gh search code "api_key" --owner "$TARGET_ORG" --json path,repository 2>/dev/null | jq '.'
gh search code "password" --owner "$TARGET_ORG" --json path,repository 2>/dev/null | head -20
# GitDorker (if installed):
python3 ~/tools/GitDorker/GitDorker.py -t GITHUB_TOKEN -d ~/tools/GitDorker/Dorks/alldorksv3 -q "$TARGET" -org
Note:
- ALL in-scope assets (every domain listed)
- Out-of-scope list (read carefully — common trap)
- Safe harbor statement
- Impact types accepted (some exclude "low")
- Average bounty amount (signals program generosity)
Run the standard pipeline above. Focus on live.txt output.
Run gf patterns and the interesting-params grep above.
Open Burp Suite. Browse the app with proxy on:
Priority 1: API endpoints with ID parameters → IDOR candidates
Priority 2: File upload features → XSS/RCE candidates
Priority 3: OAuth/SSO flows → auth bypass candidates
Priority 4: Search/filter with user input → SQLi/SSRF/SSTI candidates
Priority 5: Admin/debug endpoints → auth bypass candidates
dnsx / httpx crash)The projectdiscovery Go binaries (dnsx, httpx, naabu) occasionally SIGSEGV on macOS arm64 due to a cgo / system-resolver interaction. The crash signature is identical regardless of install method — both brew install and go install github.com/projectdiscovery/<tool>@latest produce binaries that segfault at the same address. Smoke-test once before relying on them in a real engagement:
dnsx -version # if SIGSEGV: use the dig fallback below
httpx -version # if SIGSEGV: use the curl fallback below
dnsx → dig fallback# Replaces: dnsx -l subs.txt -a -resp -silent
while read s; do
ips=$(dig +short +tries=1 +time=3 "$s" \
| grep -E '^[0-9.]+$' \
| paste -sd, -)
[ -n "$ips" ] && echo "$s|$ips"
done < subs.txt
httpx → curl fallback# Replaces: httpx -l subs.txt -silent -status-code -title -tech-detect
while read s; do
resp=$(curl -s -L -m 5 -o /tmp/body \
-w "%{http_code}|%{url_effective}|%{header_server}" \
"https://$s")
code=$(echo "$resp" | cut -d'|' -f1)
if [ "$code" != "000" ]; then
title=$(grep -oE '<title[^>]*>[^<]*</title>' /tmp/body | head -1 | sed 's/<[^>]*>//g')
echo "$s|$resp|$title"
fi
done < subs.txt
Trade-off: Serial vs. concurrent. The fallback handles ~24 subdomains in 14 seconds; the same workload on httpx with default 50 threads finishes in 2-3 seconds. For VDP-scale recon (< 100 subdomains) the fallback is fine. For mass recon (1000+) fix the toolchain first.
Verified against HackerOne's own VDP in docs/verification/recon-hackerone-vdp.md.
API spec endpoints are the single highest-leverage recon target on any modern .NET / Node / Python / Java backend. The spec discloses every endpoint, HTTP methods, parameter names + types + formats, models, validation rules — a complete attack-map in JSON. Default routes are commonly left enabled in production. Add this wordlist to the directory-fuzzing phase (after the standard common.txt pass).
swagger-paths.txt)# NSwag / Swashbuckle (ASP.NET Core)
/swagger
/swagger/
/swagger/index.html
/swagger/ui/index.html
/swagger/v1/swagger.json
/swagger/v2/swagger.json
/swagger/v3/swagger.json
/swagger/docs/v1
/swagger/docs/v2
/swagger-ui
/swagger-ui/
/swagger-ui.html
/swagger-resources
/swagger-resources/configuration/ui
/nswag
/nswag/index.html
/api/swagger
/api/swagger.json
/api/swagger/v1/swagger.json
/api/openapi
/api/openapi.json
/api/v1/swagger.json
/api/v2/swagger.json
/api-docs
/api-docs/swagger.json
# OpenAPI generic
/openapi
/openapi.json
/openapi.yaml
/openapi.yml
/openapi/v1.json
/openapi/v2.json
/openapi/v3.json
/.well-known/openapi.json
# Java / Spring (Springfox / springdoc)
/v2/api-docs
/v3/api-docs
/v3/api-docs.yaml
/v3/api-docs/swagger-config
/swagger-ui/index.html
# Python (FastAPI / Flask-RESTPlus / Connexion / DRF)
/docs
/docs/
/redoc
/redoc/
/openapi.json
/swagger.json
/swagger/?format=openapi
/swagger.yaml
# Express / Node / Hapi
/api-docs
/api-docs.json
/swagger.json
/swagger-stats
/graphql-docs
# GraphQL adjacent (often co-located)
/graphql
/graphiql
/playground
/altair
/voyager
/graphql/console
/graphql-explorer
# ReDoc / RapiDoc / Stoplight / alt UIs
/redoc
/redoc.html
/redoc-ui.html
/rapidoc
/rapidoc.html
/stoplight
/elements
# Misc / dev-leftover
/actuator
/actuator/openapi
/actuator/mappings
/q/openapi
/q/swagger-ui
/docs/swagger.json
/api/v1/docs
/api/v2/docs
/internal/swagger
/admin/swagger
/management/swagger
# After live-hosts.txt is built (Phase 1 / 2), run:
ffuf -w swagger-paths.txt -u "https://FUZZ.target.com" -mc 200,302 -fs 0 -t 50 -o swagger-hits.json
# Or with httpx for content-aware filtering:
httpx -l live-hosts.txt -path swagger-paths.txt -mc 200 -mr "swagger|openapi" -json | tee swagger-hits.jsonl
# For every hit:
jq '.paths | keys' swagger.json > endpoints.txt
jq '.components.schemas' swagger.json > schemas.json # mass-assignment field candidates
jq '.paths | keys' swagger.json becomes the input list for Autorize/ffuf per-user testing.components.schemas.UserUpdateDto enumerates isAdmin, emailVerified, tenantId, role./internal/*, /debug/*, /v0/*, /legacy/* routes documented but never auth-gated.kiterunner — natively ingests OpenAPI spec, generates requests against the API.sj (Swagger Jacker) — purpose-built for Swagger spec exploitation.apidetector (brinhosa) — Swagger-UI mass scanner.XSSwagger (vavkamil) — detects vulnerable Swagger UI versions (CVE-2018-25031 family).nuclei -t http/exposures/apis/ — built-in templates for default spec paths.A 404/403 on /swagger does NOT mean no spec is exposed. Many .NET projects route the spec under /api/swagger/v1/swagger.json rather than /swagger. Always test the full path list, not just the root.
Full attack-chain analysis is in hunt-api-misconfig → NSwag / Swagger / OpenAPI Spec Exposure.
offensive-osint — When recon needs concrete probes / wordlists / regexes beyond the basic pipeline. Workflow primitive: this skill produces the URL set; offensive-osint provides the secret regexes, GraphQL/Swagger paths, and identity-fabric probes you apply to that URL set.osint-methodology — When you need a severity rubric for what you discovered. Workflow primitive: after recon outputs subdomains.txt / live-hosts.txt / urls.txt, score each asset against osint-methodology's findings rubric to decide what gets a finding versus what stays in the asset graph.hunt-subdomain — When recon surfaces stale CNAMEs / dangling DNS. Workflow primitive: any subdomain in subdomains.txt whose CNAME points to S3 / GitHub Pages / Heroku / Shopify / Azure should auto-route to hunt-subdomain for takeover validation.security-arsenal — When the URL set is classified by gf and ready for active testing. Workflow primitive: gf xss/ssrf/sqli/idor output names become payload-class queries against security-arsenal's payload library.bb-methodology — When recon completes and Phase 1 transitions to Phase 2 (Mapping). Workflow primitive: hand the live host + URL set back to bb-methodology Phase 2 for endpoint mapping and Phase 3 vulnerability discovery routing.Engagement-derived + 2026-specific additions to the vendored foundation. Wisdom from real authorized engagements + Phase 2 verification across this repo's 31+ skill-area live tests. The upstream pipeline covers the WHAT; this layer covers the WHEN-IT-WORKS-vs-WHEN-IT-DOESN'T.
Phase 2C's HackerOne VDP recon walked from hackerone.com (24 subdomains) into a sister TLD hacker.one (12 more subdomains found in JS bundle references). Operators who only enumerate *.target.com miss attack surface that the target legitimately operates on a different domain.
Always grep JS bundles for plausible sibling TLDs:
# pull all JS, grep for sibling-TLD candidates
for url in $(cat live-hosts.txt); do
curl -s "$url" | grep -oE 'src="[^"]+\.js"' | sed 's/src="//;s/"//'
done | sort -u > js-urls.txt
# then on each JS file
for j in $(cat js-urls.txt); do
curl -s "$j" | grep -oE '[a-z0-9.-]+\.(io|app|one|dev|test|cloud|ai|co)' | sort -u
done | sort -u > sibling-tld-candidates.txt
Common sibling-TLD patterns: target.com → target.io / target.app / target.one / target.dev / target.test / target-corp.com / target-cdn.net. Always validate via WHOIS or by checking if the cert chain trusts the same internal CA before treating the sister TLD as in-scope.
Top discovery prefixes by hit rate against enterprise VDPs in our 2024-2026 corpus:
mta-sts.* api.* docs.*
dev-* staging-* *-qa
*-stage *-uat events.*
portal.* customer.* partner.*
vendor.* internal-* admin-*
employee-* hr.* jobs.*
sso.* auth.* id.*
Internal-looking subdomains often expose more surface than the marketing site — partner.target.com and vendor-portal.target.com frequently have weaker auth than the main app because they're scoped for "trusted" external users. Always send a probe to the long-tail wordlist after the standard subfinder run completes.
curl -sI <host> headers are 80% of the fingerprint:
Server: — apache / nginx / cloudflare / kestrel (= .NET Core) / openresty / envoyX-Powered-By: — PHP version, ASP.NET version, Express.jsX-Drupal-Cache, X-Generator: Drupal 9 — DrupalX-Generator: WordPress — WordPressVia: — CDN chain (1.1 varnish, 1.1 cloudfront)Set-Cookie: names — JSESSIONID (Java), PHPSESSID (PHP), ASP.NET_SessionId (.NET), connect.sid (Express), laravel_session (Laravel)JS bundle filename patterns:
/_next/static/ = Next.js/_nuxt/ = Nuxt/assets/static/ with hash filenames = Vite/static/js/main.*.chunk.js = Create React Appruntime.*.js + polyfills.*.js + main.*.js = Angular CLIThe first 10s of recon should yield a stack guess; the rest is targeting. If your fingerprint contradicts itself (Server says nginx, Set-Cookie says ASP.NET) you've found a reverse proxy front-end — note the origin app for later smuggling/cache attacks.
Critical distinction operators get wrong:
Same distinction for CloudFront:
Server: CloudFront = distribution exists, origin returned 404 — NOT a takeover.X-Cache: Error from cloudfront = origin missing entirely — potential takeover.Phase 2C verified both patterns live. Always check the EXACT response body string before filing a takeover finding — the takeover-scanner tools (subzy, subjack) match on multiple fingerprints and frequently false-positive on the "still owned, just empty" case.
Already covered in this file's Phase 2C addition. Quick reminder: dnsx/httpx may segfault on macOS arm64; the dig+curl fallback works for < 100-host runs in ~14 seconds. Don't burn an hour debugging Go binary panics when the fallback gets you to the same URL set.
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